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Abstract
I present three essays on the economics of sport, examining salary discrimination in Major League
Baseball (MLB), determinants of dismissals of college football coaches, and star player effects on
attendance in the National Basketball Association (NBA).
New Evidence of Salary Discrimination in Major League Baseball
Salary discrimination in MLB has largely been discarded as a research topic. However traditional
quantitative methods (particularly least squares regression) have concentrated on the effect of race for the
average player. This is not where we should expect to find discrimination, as the relative cost of
discriminating against a better player is surely higher.
I use quantile regression to uncover salary discrimination against black players in the lower half of the
salary distribution. Not only are the premia for white and Hispanic players statistically significant, but
they are large: up to 25% for the bottom quintile of players. I also demonstrate that racial effects may be
obscured in typical baseball salary regressions when they suffer from omitted variable bias, brought about
by failing to properly consider speed and fielding ability.
Win or Go Home: Why College Football Coaches Get Fired
Models of dismissals of sports executives frequently ignore the development of expectations regarding
performance. I explore the interplay between these expectations and the coachs tenure by examining
dismissals of college football head coaches from 1983 to 2006. Using a discrete-time hazard model, I
demonstrate that schools use prior performance in two ways: to evaluate the ability of the coach, and to
establish performance standards for retention. As recent performance is more relevant for estimating
ability, I show that stronger recent performances decrease the chance of dismissal, but stronger historic
performances increase the chance of dismissal. Results describe a continual learning process on the part of
schools. I also consider the effects of race, insider-ness, rivalries, and rules violations on retention.
ii
Day to Day with the NBA Superstars
I use censored regression (Tobit) analysis on NBA game-level attendance data to examine the superstar
externality effect identified by Berri and Schmidt (2006): star players increase road attendance, and since
home teams (at least in the NBA) retain 100% of the gate revenues, this constitutes an externality.
Game-level data has several advantages over the season-level data employed by Berri and Schmidt: the
ability to directly control for sellouts, estimation of dynamic intra-season attendance effects, and the lack
of sensitivity to star player distribution. A new intra-season effect estimated is a superstar substitution effect
accounting for a star’s negative effect on attendance at adjacent games, partially mitigating the superstar
externality.
iii
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Chapter 1
New Evidence of Salary Discrimination
in Major League Baseball
1.1 Introduction
Professional baseball in America has acted as a microcosm for examining racial and ethnic discrimination.
Baseball has followed, and in some cases led, the American trend toward integration in the twentieth
century. Jackie Robinson’s breaking of baseball’s color line in 1947 set the precedent for integration,
though it hardly removed all discrimination.
Baseball (and professional sport in general) offers an excellent testing ground for labor economics theories.
Sport (and especially baseball) is replete with performance measures, an integral part of many labor
studies. Studies of discrimination patterns in professional sports can be especially fruitful, with long
periods of detailed observations of individuals and organizations, a wide variety of situations to examine,
and major rule changes leading to natural experiments. If salary discrimination can exist in such a highly
scrutinized and visible industry, the lessons we learn should be helpful in understanding and uncovering
discrimination in wider contexts.
The clearest empirical examples of discrimination in Major League Baseball would be violations of the
“equal pay for equal work” ideal, as set forth by the Equal Pay Act (1963) and the Civil Rights Act (1964).
Recent examples have not generally been forthcoming, with most studies finding no significant difference
(see Kahn 1991 and Kahn 2000). However, Fizel (1996) finds that salary arbitrators seem to favor White
players over their Black and Hispanic counterparts.
The typical response to not finding discrimination in earnings has been to look elsewhere. Bellemore
(2001) found that blacks and Hispanics were less likely to be promoted to the major leagues than whites in
the 1960s and 1970s, with blacks still facing this discrimination in the 1990s. Jiobu (1988) found that blacks
in the 1970s and 1980s tended to have shorter careers than whites, once performance variables were taken
into consideration, a finding which he interpreted as discrimination. Other researchers have considered
various forms of customer-based discrimination and positional segregation; for a detailed overview, see
Kahn (2000).
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This essay reconsiders the question of “equal pay for equal work”. I use a longer time frame than is
common—nine years compared with the more typical one or two—and restrict attention to free agents
(players who are free to sign a contract with any team they choose). This is a sensible restriction. Some
other researchers simply estimate salary equations for all players in a given season (e.g. Kahn 1989,
Palmer and King 2006). A concern with this approach is that player performance can change markedly
within a long contract, and multi-year contracts are common. The link between salary in the last year of,
say, a seven year contract, and the performance variables in the sixth year, is likely to be strained. Much
better is to consider only players who have just signed a contract, since the salary should account for all
performance characteristics observed up to that date. While this results in a smaller data set than would
otherwise be available, the data quality is likely to be superior. I make up for the reduced number of
observations in any given year by considering a greater number of years. I discuss other implications of
my choice of dependent variable in the following section.
The implications of finding salary discrimination among free agents would be significant. Free agents
(generally) auction off their services to the highest bidder, largely unfettered by rules restricting their
choice of team or new salary. This ought to be the most freely functioning job market in baseball, with no
particular team having monopsony power (unlike when players first enter the major leagues, when the
team that owns their rights can restrict them from negotiating with other teams). Additionally, if some
group of players is consistently underpriced, it would only take a few non-discriminating teams to bid up
the price to its “correct” level. So finding salary discrimination among free agents would imply that
almost all teams discriminate.
I use quantile regression to consider whether salary differentials may exist only for players in certain
salary ranges. Becker (1975) presented the first economic models of discrimination, but in most of his
models, the workforce was homogeneous except for their race. This assumption is particularly untenable
in professional sport. One could imagine a model in which the benefit of discrimination is fixed, but the
costs of discrimination (i.e. foregoing the services of a superior player) rise as player ability increases, as
the player becomes more critical to the team’s chance of winning. Palmer and King (2006) had such a
model in mind: “The players who fill out the roster and are involved only marginally in the teams on-field
success may remain subject to discrimination. For them, the cost of discrimination to owners, teammates,
or fans will be considerably less.” In search of such discrimination, Palmer and King grouped players into
low, medium, and high salary groups, finding discrimination for their low salary group. Quantile
regression make such artificial divisions unnecessary, and allows for examination of a wider variety of
groups without the issue of dwindling sample size.
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Quantile regression is gradually becoming more known to sports researchers, though it is still
underutilized. Hamilton (1997) used quantile regression methods to investigate discrimination in
professional basketball. Hamilton obtained the curious result that black National Basketball Association
players in the high (but not the very highest) salary ranges faced discrimination. Leeds and Kowalewski
(2001) used quantile regression to examine the effects of structural changes (the introduction of free
agency and the salary cap) within the NFL player market. Again in the NFL, Simmons and Berri (2005)
explore the relationship between player salary, performance, and race at the quarterback position.
Non-salary models using quantile regression include Benz, Brandes, and Franck (2006) on match
attendance in German soccer, and Brown and Jewell (2006) estimating marginal revenue products of
women’s college basketball stars. My paper appears to be the first to apply quantile regression to the
estimation of baseball players’ salaries.
1.2 Data
An observation in the dataset is a MLB player who files for free agency, then subsequently signs for any
MLB team before the next season starts. The data cover new contracts signed for the seasons 1998-2006. 1
The player must also have taken at least 100 at-bats in the previous season, so that the statistics generated
that season are meaningful. There are 511 player-year observations, with between 36 and 75 in a given
year. I exclude pitchers, catchers, and players who primarily played as designated hitters. 2 I also exclude
Asian players, as there were too few present in the data. The independent variables include various
batting and fielding statistics, demographics of the players (age, race, ethnicity, and so on) and team
characteristics. See Table 1.1 for a full list of variables included in the model.
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the player’s base salary in the first season of the new
contract. Using the natural logarithm transformation is standard to take into account the
heteroscedasticity arising from the large salary range. However the choice of using only first season salary
is not the only reasonable option. I could use the average salary over the length of the contract, or an
1Another option would be to consider all “potential” free agents. This would include players who chose to forego free agency
and instead sign an extension with their current team. This introduces various problems. First, players may sign an extension at any
time, and may have time remaining on their current contract. This current contract would influence the new contract signed. For
example, a player with a year to play at a minimum salary might renegotiate a longer contract and receive additional compensation
immediately, while reducing his salary in subsequent seasons in compensation for the higher current salary. His overall salary takes
into account not only his ability, but the time remaining on his current contract. This is difficult to model accurately. Furthermore,
players who sign with their current team may have different attitudes toward risk — taking a guaranteed contract rather than risking
the free agent market — and hence be represented by a different salary generating process. The difficulties inherent in considering
potential free agents who forego free agency seem adequate to justify their exclusion.
2Incorporating pitchers would require a completely separate model, as the determinants of their salaries are much different to
those for batters. Also, salary determination for pitchers presents additional complications (see Krautmann, Gustafson, and Hadley
2003). Satisfactory measures of catching ability were not available to the author, and as these are likely to be important determinants
of salary, catchers were also excluded. Few designated hitter free agents were present in the data, so these were also excluded.
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Table 1.1: List of independent variables
Variable Explanation
Race The player’s race; the base category is black, non-Hispanic
Year Year (base is 1998)
log(career Games) Natural log of games played in the player’s career prior to free agency
Age Player’s age in the year of free agency
3-Year OBP On Base Percentage in the three seasons prior to free agency
3-Year SLG Slugging Percentage in the three seasons prior to free agency
Diff OBP On Base Percentage in the season prior to free agency minus 3-Year OBP
Diff SLG Slugging Percentage in the season prior to free agency minus 3-Year SLG
RBIs Runs Batted In in the season prior to free agency
Speed Average of five measures of player speed proposed by James (1987)
calculated for previous season
Position The primary position played in the first season of the new contract
(base category is First Base (1B))
Gold Gloves Gold Gloves won in the player’s entire career
Zone Rating Measure of fielding ability based on percentage of balls fielded within player’s “zone”
Revenue Total revenue of the team for which the player signs, in millions
Population Population of the Metropolitan Statistical Area
for the team with which the player signs, in millions
PropBlack The proportion of blacks within the Metropolitan Statistical Area
PropHisp The proportion of Hispanics within the Metropolitan Statistical Area
PropWhite The proportion of whites within the Metropolitan Statistical Area
PropBlackInt Interaction term; equal to PropBlack if the player is black, 0 otherwise
PropHispInt Interaction term; equal to PropHisp if the player is Hispanic, 0 otherwise
PropWhiteInt Interaction term; equal to PropWhite if the player is white, 0 otherwise
average present value of salary. First season salary provided a better fit in my models. I do not consider
incentive clauses built in to contracts, where a player may receive more than his base salary if he achieves
certain awards or amounts of playing time. Such incentives are common for pitchers, but less common for
position players. A brief survey indicated that most position players did not have incentivized contracts,
and when they did, the total possible incentives rarely exceeded 15% of base salary. Krautmann and
Oppenheimer (2002) note that “. . . for the most part, such forms of compensation constitute a very small
amount of the average player’s total pay.” Black players did not appear to have more incentive clauses
built in to their contracts. Another form of risk-sharing, the “option year” is not uncommon for very good
players, allowing the contract to extend the option of one of the parties. But since the main group of
interest is the players in the lower salary ranges, ignoring option years seems innocuous.
The data come from a variety of sources. The batting and fielding statistics and player demographics
come from Sean Lahman’s Baseball Archive 3. Transactions information come from Retrosheet 4, while
3http://www.baseball1.com/
4http://www.retrosheet.org/
4
Table 1.2: Means, medians, and standard deviations of variables
Black White Hispanic
Variable Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Salary 1.776 1 2.038 1 2.423 1.2
(in millions) (2.083) (2.387) (2.999)
Age 34.436 35 33.27 33 33.329 33
(3.479) (3.034) (4.051)
Experience 11.782 11.115 9.537 8.35 10.904 9.66
in 100s of games (5.504) (4.723) (5.011)
3-Year OBP 0.336 0.333 0.341 0.34 0.334 0.333
(0.031) (0.03) (0.028)
3-Year SLG 0.412 0.405 0.425 0.424 0.421 0.406
(0.065) (0.056) (0.065)
Diff OBP -0.002 0 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002
(0.025) (0.024) (0.024)
Diff SLG -0.006 -0.002 -0.005 -0.006 -0.008 -0.004
(0.041) (0.043) (0.045)
RBIs 44.221 38.5 46.86 40 49.148 40
(27.423) (27.79) (29.914)
Speed 5.35 5.424 4.775 4.722 5.006 4.961
(0.728) (0.586) (0.615)
Gold Gloves 0.021 0 0.063 0 0.121 0
(0.254) (0.559) (0.915)
Zone Rating 0.851 0.858 0.812 0.82 0.832 0.84
(0.057) (0.068) (0.084)
Revenue 120.574 120.3 120.294 121.5 131.202 128
(in millions) (40.063) (42.074) (45.058)
Population 4.94 3.381 5.099 3.252 5.767 4.124
(in millions) (4.096) (4.437) (4.944)
PropBlack 0.129 0.112 0.125 0.115 0.137 0.138
(0.073) (0.073) (0.071)
PropHisp 0.135 0.161 0.127 0.061 0.14 0.161
(0.105) (0.108) (0.115)
PropWhite 0.653 0.662 0.661 0.664 0.639 0.607
(0.134) (0.131) (0.143)
standard deviations in parentheses
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salary data comes from the late Doug Pappas 5 and from updates from people continuing his work.
Population data comes from US 2000 (or Canadian 2001) Census data; populations for each city are based
on the Metropolitan Statistical Areas (or Census Metropolitan Areas) for each city. Team revenue data
comes from annual reports on such published by Forbes. 6
I inferred racial and ethnic classifications for each player from pictures of the players available on the
internet. I used several sources when the classifications were not immediately clear. In the case of players
who could reasonably be considered both black and white (e.g. Derek Jeter), I classified them as black. A
white or black player may also be Hispanic—I judged this in the same way, using country of origin and
last name as aids. White will denote a white non-Hispanic player, while White Hispanic will denote a white
Hispanic player; similarly for blacks. Hispanic alone refers to Hispanic players of any race. There are 222
observations of white players, 81 white Hispanic, 140 black, and 68 black Hispanic.
1.3 Least Squares Regression Model
I first analyzed the data using weighted least squares regression. The model follows the standard
log-linear form:
ln(SALARY ) = β0 + β1PERFORM + β2POSITION + β3Y EAR
+β4DEMOGRAPHICS + β5RACE + ε
(1.1)
where PERFORM is a vector of performance variables (both the previous season and over the course of
the player’s career, plus difference variables to account for recent trends in performance) for hitting and
fielding, POSITION is the main position played by the player in the first season of the new contract,
Y EAR is the first year of the new contract, DEMOGRAPHICS is a vector of player and team
characteristics such as age and population in the city of the team with which the player signs, and RACE
is the racial and ethnic classification of the player. Table 1.1 lists the variables, while Table 1.2 provides
summary statistics. Discrimination is inferred when β5 is significantly different from zero.
This formulation of the salary model is not the only possible choice. With the semilogarithmic form I force
each variable to have a separable multiplicative effect on salary. In particular the effects are the same
across positions and racial groups. Krautmann (1999) states that “while a hitter’s job is simply to create
5http://roadsidephotos.sabr.org/baseball/data.htm
6http://www.forbes.com; data for 1998 are not available for most teams, and were estimated as the average of 1997 and 1999
figures
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runs, the marginal product of a pitcher varies depending on his role,” a statement that he reiterates in
Krautmann, Gustafson, and Hadley (2003), by demonstrating that separate equations are needed to
estimate salaries for the various classes of pitchers. No researcher has found that separate models are
required for different position players. I found no evidence of separate salary determination processes for
the various racial and ethnic groups.
I weight the observations because some players appear more than once in the data set. Indeed, one player
(Rey Sanchez) signed seven contracts over this period. There are 293 players represented, and each player
is given a total weight of one. I weight each observation by the inverse of the number of contracts signed
by that player over this period. 7 Ideally I would include a random effect for each player, to account for
unobserved but rewarded characteristics of individual players. However most players sign only one
contract over the given period, so a random effects model is not useful. 8
I considered two different formulations of the RACE variable. Model 1 uses three categories: White, Black,
and Hispanic. Here White and Black refer to whites and blacks without Hispanic descent, and Hispanic
refers to players of Hispanic descent regardless of their race. Model 2 uses four categories: White, Black,
White Hispanic, and Black Hispanic. Regression results are given in Table 1.3. 9
Most germane to this article are the racial effects. The coefficients are increases in the natural log of salary
accruing to the various racial groups, all else held constant. In Model 1, the coefficient of 0.152 for White
implies that whites are paid 100(exp(0.152)− 1)% = 16.4% more than comparably qualified blacks. This
effect is statistically significant, with a p-value of 0.013. Hispanics are paid 10.7% more than comparably
7Experimentation with different weighting procedures revealed that the choice of weights does not affect the qualitative results.
In particular, using an unweighted (i.e. ordinary least squares) model yielded racial coefficient estimates which were similar to the
weighted model.
8My choice of weighted least squares (and weighted quantile regression) is admittedly non-standard. However I believe that in the
absence of the ability to use a fixed- or random-effects model, it is a good compromise. I offer the following scenario as a justification:
suppose the data set consists of ten players, five of whom are white, and five of whom are black. Each white player signs one contract
over my period of observation, whereas four of the five black players sign one, and one black player signs six contracts. Suppose that
the first nine players are “normal” in the sense that their salaries seem reasonably well explained by a model including the standard
performance variables. However the black player who signs six contracts is exceptional: he has an excellent work ethic, a great
clubhouse presence, and is a perennial fan favorite. It makes sense that this player would be rewarded for his abilities. However I
cannot observe these “intangibles”.
If I estimate a salary model using performance variables only, this player will have a consistently positive residual. When I add a
race variable, the race variable will pick up this residual and attribute it to skin color - 60% of the observations of black players have
very high salaries relative to their performance variables, therefore black players must be paid more than whites. A fixed- or random-
effects model would prevent this mistake, but with the small numbers of repetitions, this is not feasible. Instead we can use weights,
weighting each of the observations by the inverse of the number of contracts signed. This essentially allows each of the exceptional
player’s contracts to count only one-sixth toward the estimation of the model coefficients. While this does not completely remove the
specification error from omitting the non-performance characteristics, it lessens its effect dramatically.
There is no indication in the data that anything this extreme is happening. As noted above, estimation with OLS and with WLS
yields almost identical results. Simulation results (available from the author upon request) on artificial data suggest that WLS outper-
forms OLS by about 33%, in terms of reducing the number of false positives in the absence of any real racial difference.
9POSITION coefficients are not presented due to lack of space. From highest to lowest paid, the positions are Shortstop, Second
Base, Third Base, Center Field, Left or Right Field, First Base. As percentages above the salary for First Basemen, the premia in
Model 1 are 74.17%, 34.68%, 23.86%, 16.80%, and 8.28% respectively. However note that there is large variation in average Zone
Rating by position; this depresses the Center Field premium, for example, as Center Fielders have the highest average Zone Rating.
Results for other models are similar.
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Table 1.3: Estimated coefficients for weighted least squares regression models
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Intercept 3.53 ** 3.71 ** 3.14 * 3.17 * 5.58 *** 4.79 ***
(2.01) (2.09) (1.74) (1.75) (3.2) (2.7)
Hispanic 0.102 0.101 0.0481 0.085 0.0869
(1.57) (1.54) (0.36) (1.28) (1.31)
Black Hispanic 0.0656
(0.81)
White Hispanic 0.133 *
(1.75)
White 0.152 ** 0.153 ** 0.156 ** 0.279 0.114 * 0.127 **
(2.5) (2.51) (2.55) (1) (1.84) (2.05)
Year 0.033 *** 0.0329 *** 0.035 *** 0.0348 *** 0.0292 *** 0.0291 ***
(3.01) (2.99) (3.11) (3.08) (2.6) (2.6)
Age 0.0766 0.0635 0.0769 0.0725 0.0375 0.0424
(0.78) (0.64) (0.78) (0.74) (0.37) (0.42)
Age2 -0.00217 -0.00199 -0.00217 -0.0021 -0.00171 -0.00177
(-1.51) (-1.37) (-1.51) (-1.45) (-1.16) (-1.21)
Experience 0.595 *** 0.601 *** 0.594 *** 0.598 *** 0.616 *** 0.617 ***
(9.26) (9.29) (9.2) (9.14) (9.37) (9.43)
3-Year OBP 5.87 *** 5.87 *** 5.99 *** 5.96 *** 6.8 *** 6.55 ***
(6.26) (6.25) (6.31) (6.24) (7.21) (6.91)
3-Year SLG 3.11 *** 3.11 *** 3.13 *** 3.13 *** 2.51 *** 2.75 ***
(5.06) (5.05) (5.06) (5.05) (4.07) (4.41)
Diff OBP 1.05 1 0.929 0.905 0.95 0.711
(0.89) (0.85) (0.78) (0.76) (0.79) (0.59)
Diff SLG 1.77 ** 1.8 ** 1.87 ** 1.88 ** 1.86 ** 2.01 ***
(2.42) (2.46) (2.54) (2.54) (2.49) (2.7)
RBIs 0.0149 *** 0.0149 *** 0.0148 *** 0.0148 *** 0.0152 *** 0.0148 ***
(11.92) (11.88) (11.79) (11.76) (12.07) (11.57)
Speed 0.192 *** 0.19 *** 0.191 *** 0.189 ***
(4.72) (4.63) (4.68) (4.57)
Zone Rating 0.773 ** 0.81 ** 0.824 ** 0.811 ** 0.872 **
(2.01) (2.09) (2.13) (2.08) (2.22)
Gold Gloves 0.0939 ** 0.0939 ** 0.0902 ** 0.0901 ** 0.0874 ** 0.0845 **
(2.39) (2.39) (2.28) (2.27) (2.17) (2.1)
Revenue 0.00152 * 0.00154 * 0.00138 * 0.00138 * 0.0021 ** 0.00193 **
(1.89) (1.92) (1.69) (1.69) (2.57) (2.37)
Population 0.0656 *** 0.0653 *** 0.061 ** 0.0609 ** 0.0636 *** 0.0634 ***
(2.9) (2.89) (2.22) (2.22) (2.75) (2.75)
Population2 -0.00321 *** -0.00322 *** -0.00303 ** -0.00304 ** -0.00316 *** -0.00309 ***
(-2.83) (-2.83) (-2.34) (-2.33) (-2.72) (-2.67)
PropBlack 0.631 0.639
(1.53) (1.42)
PropHisp 0.403 0.311
(0.86) (0.63)
PropWhite 0.294 0.389
(0.74) (0.9)
PropBlackInt -0.0516
(-0.07)
PropHispInt 0.339
(0.67)
PropWhiteInt -0.199
(-0.51)
t-statistics in parentheses
* Significant at 10% level. ** Significant at 5% level. *** Significant at 1% level.
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Table 1.4: Summary Statistics for Models 1-6
Statistic Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 5
Sample Size 511 511 511 511 511 511
R2 0.7798 0.7784 0.7792 0.7795 0.7657 0.768
Adj.R2 0.7684 0.768 0.7679 0.7667 0.7562 0.7581
Standard Error 0.377 0.377 0.377 0.378 0.387 0.385
qualified blacks, though this effect is not statistically significant. In Model 2, we see that white Hispanics
receive more of a salary differential than do black Hispanics. However this difference is not significant,
with a p-value from a chi-squared reduction in explained sum of squares test (RESST) of 0.77, so I proceed
with the Hispanics grouped together.
Model 3 adds the proportions of blacks, Hispanics, and whites within the signing team’s Metropolitan
Statistical Area in an attempt to consider fan discrimination.10 These proportions are not significant
predictors of salary. In an attempt to capture same-race bias, Model 4 adds an interaction term for each
racial group. The term is the product of the proportion of the relevant group with a dummy variable
indicating whether the player is a member of that group. This would capture a possible effect where a
premium paid to white players rose as the proportion of whites in the city rose, for example. None of
these interactions are significant predictors of salary either. The addition of these interaction variables
obscures the fact that Black players are still paid less, so I proceed with the more parsimonious Model 1 in
the following section. Model 5 removes the Speed variable to evaluate its effect on the racial coefficients; I
comment further on this in the Discussion.
1.4 Quantile Regression Model
While the least squares regression model can give us some idea of the effects of race on salary, quantile
regression offers a more detailed perspective. Least squares regression estimates the mean salary
conditional on the independent variables considered; quantile regression estimates salary quantiles, or
percentiles, conditional on the independent variables. For example, we can estimate the conditional
median salary function, which mitigates the impact of outlying observations; and indeed, given enough
data, we can equally easily estimate any quantile of the data.
OLS solves the following optimization problem:
minβ∈<
n∑
i=1
(yi − xiβ)2 (1.2)
10Non-black, non-white proportions range from 2% in Pittsburgh to 24% in San Fransciso, so there is no collinearity problem here.
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Table 1.5: Estimated coefficients for RACE in the quantile regression model
Quantile Hispanic White
10% 0.201 *** 22.3% 0.244 *** 27.69%
(3.11) (3.24)
25% 0.191 * 21.02% 0.193 ** 21.28%
(1.96) (2.17)
50% 0.114 * 12.12% 0.125 ** 13.32%
(1.73) (2.04)
75% 0.03 3.00% 0.121 12.86%
(0.35) (1.44)
90% 0.044 4.46% 0.058 5.98%
(0.85) (1.2)
* Significant at 10% level. ** Significant at 5% level. *** Significant at 1% level.
Estimated t-statistics given in parentheses11.
The percentages are the salary premia for Hispanics and Whites over comparably qualified Blacks.
In contrast, quantile regression solves:
minβ∈<
n∑
i=1
ρτ (yi − xiβ) (1.3)
where, making use of the indicator function I(.),
ρτ (x) = (τ − I(x ≤ 0))x (1.4)
By varying τ , we vary the quantile estimated. Observe that when τ = 0.5, ρ0.5(.) is essentially the absolute
value function. We can then obtain estimates of the regression parameters βτ for various quantiles τ of
interest. Note that for weighted least squares and weighted quantile regression, we simply multiply each
summand by its respective weight. See Koenker (2005) for more details on quantile regression.
The salary equation (1.1) was estimated by weighted quantile regression. Full results are presented
graphically in Figures 1.2 and 1.3 at the end of this chapter. Note that the estimated coefficients have the
same interpretation as in the least squares model , except that they refer to the particular (estimated
salary) quantile rather than the mean. Table 1.5 gives the estimated RACE coefficients for the quantile
regression models, at selected quantiles. Also given are the percentage premia for Hispanics and whites
over blacks at the corresponding quantiles. Figure 1.1 shows the RACE coefficients from the 10% to the
90% quantile, in increments of 10%.
When comparing Hispanics and blacks, and comparing whites and blacks, the coefficients tell a similar
11Standard errors are estimated following Koenker and Machado (1999), assuming non-iid errors and local (in tau) linearity (in x)
of the the conditional quantile functions, computing a Huber sandwich estimate using a local estimate of the sparsity.
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Figure 1.1: Quantile regression race coefficients. The shaded area represents a 90% confidence bound.
story; however this story is markedly different from what we would assume from least squares regression.
We had previously seen that whites were paid a premium of about 16%, and Hispanics about 11%, above
what their black counterparts earned. Quantile regression reveals that this difference is largest at the
bottom of the salary distribution. Not only that, but the difference is significant for both whites and
Hispanics. At the upper end of the salary distribution, the salary premiums for Hispanics and whites are
not significantly different from zero.
The question of whether these differences in coefficients is statistically significant is more somewhat
complicated. When we test against the alternative hypothesis of general inequality, for example
H0 : βwhite(0.10) = β
white
(0.20) = · · · = βwhite(0.90) vs H1 : at least one pair of the coefficients differs
the adjustment for multiple comparisons ensures that very strong evidence of inequality is required to
reject the null. A better formulation of hypotheses would reflect the theory that we should find salary
discrimination in the lowest salary ranges:
H0 : the quantile regression coefficients do not decrease as the quantiles increase vs
H1 : the quantile regression coefficients decrease as the quantiles increase
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A Spearman’s rank correlation test performed on the quantile regression coefficients gives an exact p-value
of less than 0.001 for both the Hispanic and white coefficients, suggesting strong evidence that the quantile
regression coefficients do decrease across the quantiles—that is, that salary discrimination decreases (as a
percentage of salary, since the dependent variable is the naturaly log of salary) as salary increases.
1.5 Discussion
Not only are the salary differentials for the players at the lower end of the salary distribution statistically
significant, the observed magnitudes are quite large. White and Hispanic players in the lowest two deciles
earn a premium of more than 20% over the salaries that accrue to their black counterparts. The size of the
salary differential falls for players in the middle of the salary distribution, until (statistical) equality occurs
in the upper half of the salary distribution for blacks and Hispanics, and the upper third for blacks and
whites.
The findings of the present paper are at odds with those from most previous papers on the same subject. It
is important to consider why this is so. The first main reason for this result is the choice of modelling only
free agents. Free agents tend to be weaker players on average than players who sign extensions with their
previous teams. We know this because of the difference in average salaries. Over the nine years of my
study, the average free agent earned $2,078,701 in his first season of the new contract. The average player
on an opening day roster earned $2,260,935 per year over this period. 12 This includes the players in the
first several years of their contract who are paid significantly lower than their free market wage because
they are not eligible for free agency. Studies modelling a single season’s salary typically exclude or
dummy out these players, so the population of players who could be eligible for free agency would
include many more players who fall into my “high” salary range. This would suppress the effect of the
lower end of the salary distribution on overall results, and assuming that there exists no salary
discrimination among these players, decrease the chance of finding statistically significant racial
coefficients.
The vast majority of the players in the lower salary ranges sign single-year contracts. In the data, players
signing single-year contracts average a salary of $1,148,633, compared with an average salary of $4,011,675
for players signing multi-year contracts. Krautmann and Oppenheimer (2002) warn that omitting length
of contract from salary models biases the estimates. However since length of contract is almost irrelevant
in the lower ranges of the salary distribution (almost all such players sign single-year contracts) this
12Data from http://www.sportsline.com/mlb/salaries/avgsalaries
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cannot affect the main result of the article, which is that salary discrimination agaisnt blacks exists in the
low salary ranges.
The second main reason for finding significant racial coefficients is the inclusion of the variables Zone
Rating and Speed. Zone rating (delevoped by John Dewan while at STATS Inc.) measures fielding ability,
measuring the percentage of batted balls that enter a fielder’s zone and are cleanly fielded. The Speed
scores are based on the five speed metrics developed by Bill James in James (1987); I normalized each one
to have a mean of 5 and a standard deviation of 1, with the overall standard deviation for the average of
the five scores becoming 0.677. In my data, black players are faster (average Speed score of 5.350
compared with 4.775 for whites and 5.006 for Hispanics) and better fielders (average ZoneRating of 0.851
compared with 0.812 for whites and 0.832 for Hispanics). Further, the variables Speed and Zone Rating are
not highly correlated with the other variables. The maximum absolute correlations with the other
independent variables are 0.184 and 0.106 respectively; a correlation matrix of the independent variables is
presented at the end of the chapter. While position dummies can soak up differences in fielding ability
across positions, they cannot account for differences within positions. The omission of these variables
leads to biased estimates of the racial coefficients. For comparison, I estimate Model 5 without either of
these variables, and Model 6 with Speed omitted. In Model 5, the Hispanic and White coefficients fall to
0.085 and 0.114 respectively, with neither significant at the 5% level. Including Zone Rating in Model 6, the
coefficients rise to 0.087 and 0.127, with the White coefficient becoming significant. The omission of these
variables decreases the racial coefficients. When included, Zone Rating and Speed have the expected sign,
are statistically significant, and have consistent estimates across models. Further, I believe that team
decisionmakers do value these characteristics, so the inclusion of these variables seems appropriate.
There may be some selection issues associated with free agency. The choice of free agency by a player is
non-trivial and endogenous. Players who are eligible for free agency may re-sign with their current team
instead of declaring themselves free agents—assuming of course that their current team offers them a
contract. Teams are likely to have some degree of private information which leads them to make favorable
offers to players they consider valuable, possibly above the expected value of the contract that would be
obtained in free agency. If this private information is correlated with race, then a correctly functioning
market would anticipate that race was a reasonable predictor for ability within the restricted pool of free
agents. Similarly, it may be that black players who have overperformed relative to their true ability are
more likely to choose free agency. This is distinct from the idea of racial differences in the overall
(measured by observable statistics) quality of the free agent pool. It could be related to risk attitudes;
signing a contract with your current team is less risky than attempting to sign a contract as a free agent.
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Table 1.6: Adding statistics from the first year of the new contract to Model 1
Statistic Model 1 Model 1A
Sample Size 453 453
No. Regressors 22 25
R2 0.7660 0.7761
Rˆ2 0.7540 0.7629
Standard Error 0.3858 0.3787
Hispanic Coefficient 0.131 * 0.123 *
White Coefficient 0.154 ** 0.142 **
* Significant at 10% level. ** Significant at 5% level. *** Significant at 1% level.
The only study done in this regard with baseball players is Fizel (1996). Fizel examined whether race
played a role in salary arbitration decisions, finding that black players were less likely to win arbitration
decisions than were white players. But he also found that this was not due to differing attitudes toward
risk. In addition, Hispanic players were even less likely to win arbitration.
There are likely to be important aspects of salary determination that I have not modeled. Raw statistics
cannot replace expert guidance. Using only a small number of statistics, researchers cannot hope to
capture all of a player’s hitting ability. Managers should be able to anticipate trends in performance better
than I can, because they have spent many hours analyzing individual players. Alternatively, players in a
“contract year” may put forward more effort; and many of the current model’s independent variables are
based on that contract year in isolation. If managers could see through this effort, this could explain some
of the salary differentials.
In order to address each of the preceding concerns, I reran Model 1 adding statistics from the first year of
the new contract. If this year’s statistics are good predictors of salary, it suggests that there are important
determinants of salary that I am not able to capture using previous years’ data. These determinants may
be correlated with race, and it may be their omission that leads to my results. I added the following
statistics for the first year of the new contract: on-base percentage, slugging percentage, and RBIs. I
restricted to the 453 players with at least 100 at-bats in the new season, so that the hitting statistics would
be meaningful. Table 1.6 summarizes the results of Model 1 restricted to these 453 players, and of
Model 1A (including the statistics from the new season).
The magnitudes of the race coefficients do fall slightly in Model 1A, by less than one-tenth. Black players
may underperform in the first year of a new contract; this is an interesting idea for future research.
However the coefficients remain similar to before, so the qualitative results remain the same: according to
performance statistics, black players (in the lower salary ranges) are underpaid.
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A standard criticism of salary models that reveal some sort of differential is that there may be omitted
variable bias. If a variable which is positively associated with white and Hispanic players is omitted, but
this variable is highly prized by employers, then the estimated premiums accruing to white and Hispanic
players will be biased upwards. The results with Speed and Zone Rating show the danger of this, even
when the model seems to predict fairly well. The present model considers an even wider range of
predictors than is usually used in sports models, so hopefully the chance of omitted variable bias is
minimized.
Baseball commentators and fans often talk of “intangibles”; qualities that make players better, but by their
nature are not measurable. Leadership ability, “clutchness” (the ability to make important plays late in
close games, or “in the clutch”), and clubhouse presence are lauded as important characteristics that
players may or may not possess. It seems unlikely that these characteristics are associated with white and
Hispanic players but not black players enough to create any rewardable difference in ability.
One important omitted variable is player popularity. Player popularity may be correlated with skin color.
To the extent that popularity translates into increased revenues for the team, rewarding popular players
with higher salaries is rational for teams. This is customer discrimination, in the sense of Becker (1975).
Player popularity effects have previously been suggested to be important for star players rather than the
mediocre ones, and since the racial salary effects in this article are concentrated among the mediocre
players, this seems an unlikely explanation.
The evidence on popularity of baseball players stemming from race is mixed. Nardinelli and Simon (1990)
studied the market for collectible baseball cards, finding that the cards for white players sold for around
10% more than those for black and Hispanic players. Indeed, Hispanic players were more discriminated
against than were blacks in their study. Hanssen and Andersen (1999) examined MLB’s All-Star vote, in
which fans vote for the players they want to play in the annual All-Star game. They showed that while
discrimination against blacks appeared in the All-star vote in the 1970s, it disappeared in the 1980s, and
may have favored blacks over whites in the 1990s. No pattern of discrimination for or against Hispanics
was found. Depken and Ford (2006) offer a more detailed study of the same topic for the 1990s, finding
that black and Hispanic players are actually favored over white players.
Becker (1975) described salary discrimination as being caused by customers, employers, or coworkers.
The present salary model is unable to distinguish between these causes. As for employer discrimination,
Becker suggested a “contact theory of discrimination”—discrimination within large companies would
probably be concentrated among management, since these are the people that the top company officials
deal with on a day-to-day basis. Such a theory has a curious interpretation in baseball. During a baseball
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game, the best players are out on the field, while the mediocre players remain on the bench—with the
manager, who may have influence over salaries. Baseball managers are predominately older white men,
and if they prefer to surround themselves with players of the same race, this may help to explain the
salary differentials. To consider this, I added a dummy variable for whether or not the player’s team
started the year with a black manager (there were too few Hispanic managers to consider), and interacted
it with the player’s race. The effects were not significant, failing to lend support to a
manager-benchwarmer contact theory of discrimination in baseball.
1.6 Conclusions
In this article, I have used MLB data from 1998-2006 to examine salary determination for MLB players. I
have used a rich set of predictors, and concentrated on free agents, for whom the link between predictors
and salary is likely to be strongest. I show that significant salary premia for white and Hispanic free agent
position players over their similarly qualified black counterparts, concentrated in the lower end of the
salary distribution. Weighted least squares regression shows that the premium accruing to Hispanics is
about 11%, and to whites, about 16%. In the least squares regression, only the white effect is significant.
Weighted quantile regression reveals that the differential is greater than 20% for the bottom 20% of free
agents, and insignificant for Hispanics in the top half of the salary distribution and for whites in the top
third of the salary distribution. The presence of these salary differentials is a mystery—salary differentials
seem most unlikely to occur amongst free agents, the market for whom ought to be relatively efficient. I
find no evidence for a manager-benchwarmer contact theory of discrimination, but it remains unclear
from where the discrimination emanates.
These salary differentials are not only statistically significant, but economically significant also. Salary
differentials are greater than 20% for the bottom 20% of free agents, and greater than 10% for the rest of
the bottom half of the salary distribution. Even a 10% salary differential at median free agent salaries is
over $200,000 per year. These results are important not only for baseball and professional sports, but also
as an example of salary discrinimination in a highly visible labor market. The salary differentials exist
despite a plethora of performance measures and the attention of hundreds of analysts and millions of fans.
While a casual observer may assume that the salary differentials presented in this paper are not surprising
for baseball, the opposite is true. Kahn (2000) writes that when it comes to baseball, “. . . these kinds of
analyses never seem to find a significantly positive salary premium for white players.” The evidence for a
salary premium for Hispanics over blacks uncovered by quantile regression in this paper may go some
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way to explaining why significant positive salary premia are rarely found: they exist, but only for a subset
of the population. Insisting on fitting the same model for all players, with only a location-shift parameter
for race as in least-squares regression, will not uncover the more subtle racial effects if the salary group in
which discrimination takes place is sufficiently small.
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Age 1.000 0.699 0.228 0.026 -0.005 0.054 0.016 -0.106 -0.031 0.027 0.107 0.034
Experience 0.699 1.000 0.319 0.225 0.058 0.100 0.346 -0.022 0.081 0.076 0.179 0.063
3-Year OBP 0.228 0.319 1.000 0.517 -0.014 -0.010 0.343 0.008 0.131 0.106 0.063 0.044
3-Year SLG 0.026 0.225 0.517 1.000 0.031 -0.031 0.638 -0.184 0.098 0.028 0.120 0.080
Diff OBP -0.005 0.058 -0.014 0.031 1.000 0.635 0.197 -0.004 -0.040 0.092 0.037 0.029
Diff SLG 0.054 0.100 -0.010 -0.031 0.635 1.000 0.289 0.003 -0.036 0.020 0.039 0.015
RBIs 0.016 0.346 0.343 0.638 0.197 0.289 1.000 -0.089 0.115 0.080 0.108 0.112
Speed -0.106 -0.022 0.008 -0.184 -0.004 0.003 -0.089 1.000 0.007 0.209 0.041 -0.001
Gold Gloves -0.031 0.081 0.131 0.098 -0.040 -0.036 0.115 0.007 1.000 0.029 0.047 0.081
Zone Rating 0.027 0.076 0.106 0.028 0.092 0.020 0.080 0.209 0.029 1.000 0.065 -0.096
Revenue 0.107 0.179 0.063 0.120 0.037 0.039 0.108 0.041 0.047 0.065 1.000 0.475
Population 0.034 0.063 0.044 0.080 0.029 0.015 0.112 -0.001 0.081 -0.096 0.475 1.000
Table 1.7: Correlation matrix of explanatory variables
Observe in particular the correlations of Speed and Zone Rating, variables which are typically omitted from salary regressions, and
which are largely uncorrelated with the other explanatory variables.
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Figure 1.2: Quantile regression coefficients. The shaded area represents a 90% confidence band, so when the band
does not include zero, the coefficient is significant from zero at that quantile.
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Figure 1.3: Quantile regression coefficients continued.
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Chapter 2
Win or Go Home: Why College Football
Coaches Get Fired
2.1 Introduction
Few sports generate as much controversy as college football. Everything seems to be constantly in flux;
players come and go, as do rule changes, conference alignments, and methods for determining postseason
berths and national champions. Certain college coaches like Bobby Bowden of Florida State and Joe
Paterno of Penn State stand firm against the constantly changing tides; but for every Bowden or Paterno,
there are dozens of other coaches whose jobs are traded like collectible cards.
“Everyone knows” why coaches get fired: it’s because they don’t win enough. But this banal statement
obscures the fact that some very interesting factors influence these institutional decisions. Such factors
may generalize well beyond sport, to shed light on why business executives such as CEOs are dismissed.
Frederickson, Hambrick, and Baumrin (1988) (hereafter FHB) develop a theoretical model of CEO
dismissal. They suggest that current organizational performance affects retention, but is mitigated by the
decisionmakers’ expectations about performance, the allegiances and values of the decisionmaker, the
availability of alternative candidates, and the incumbent’s power. Guided by these constructs, I identify
variables that might affect the probability of dismissal for college football coaches.
In so doing, I explore how schools learn about the ability of a coach. No school sets out to hire a “loser”;
but most coaches are eventually fired. When a coach is hired, his eventual performance at the school is
unknown. Performance (that is, wins and losses) reveal the coach’s ability. Common wisdom suggests
that coaches be given an initial five-year period in which to acclimate, recruit, and produce:
Rey Dempsey, who was dismissed as the Memphis State football coach after two losing seasons,
including a 2-7-2 mark this year, said he had not been given a chance to build a winning team.
“Two years is not enough for anybody,”’ he said. “I signed a five-year contract because it’s generally
accepted across the country that it takes this amount of time to start winning consistently.”
Rey Dempsey, former Memphis State football coach, quoted in New York Times, November 30, 1985.
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Figure 2.1: Dismissals of college football head coaches by tenure length, 1983-2006 (excludes coaches who are never
dismissed)
Tyrone Willingham needed more time.
Three years is simply not a long enough period to evaluate a coach at a high-profile institution like Notre
Dame, where someone like Willingham needs four or five years in order to recruit enough personnel to fit
his system. He was incredibly fortunate to have won 10 games in his first season, but that win total raised
expectations and gave fans and alumni false hope.
Kirk Herbstreit, on former Notre Dame football coach Tyrone Willingham, ESPN.com, November 30, 2004
Five years are not always necessary for schools to make a final decision. The above cases are not unique:
Figure 2.1 shows that a third of all dismissals (68 out of 196) take place in the first four years of a coach’s
tenure. Schools continually evaluate a coach’s suitability for the position, based on his performance; and
when performance is sufficiently below their expectations, they wield the axe.
But how are these expectations formed? The expectations of success at Notre Dame, a program that claims
11 national champion teams, are surely higher than those at Memphis State (“Memphis” as of 1994),
which last had a ten-win season in 1938. Further, as the Herbstreit quote indicates, expectations may be
fluid, varying from year to year.
The principle contribution of this essay is in exploring the formation and evolution of these expectations. I
measure expectations by the effect of win percent, both current and historical, on the probability of
dismissal. I show that additional wins in the last three years decrease the probability of dismissal, though
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more recent wins are more effective in this regard. However stronger performances before this increase the
probability of dismissal by raising expectations. Recent history (from four to ten years in the past) seems
to be especially important in expectation formation; performances from 11 to 30 years ago are also
relevant, but performances from prior to this do not affect the probability of dismissal at all.
The role of history in determining current expectations is probably greater in college football than in any
other major team sport. The best programs attract the best recruits and the best coaches, leading to the
persistence of success: the best teams today are largely the same as the best teams from thirty years ago. In
college basketball, individual players can have a much greater impact on outcomes than in football; and
salary caps and new-player drafts in professional sports reduce the persistence of success in those outlets.
Historical win percent should then be a strong indicator of current expectations, and the higher the
current expectations, the more likely it should be that a coach is fired, holding current performance
constant. But “current performance” appears to be measured only by performance in the most recent three
seasons, with the impact decaying quickly over these three years. This reflects two facts. Coaches’ abilities
may change, so that the most recent performance should be the most relevant. In addition, earlier
performance may reflect the strength of the recruits from a former coach, so that later performance reflects
both coaching ability and recruiting ability.
Naturally, schools do give an advantage to new coaches. I model the effect of tenure on dismissals directly,
by including it as a polynomial in the logit model of dismissals. I also interact tenure with various other
characteristics of the coach—race, alumni-status, and whether or not the coach has recently committed a
major NCAA rules infraction—to determine the impact of these elements on the chance of dismissal. This
flexible approach to modelling tenure’s effect pays off with intuitive, statistically significant, and
economically meaningful results, showing that no simple first-year dummy (as in Mixon and Trevin˜o
2004), linear term (as in Fizel and D’itri 1997) or even quadratic term (as in Audas, Dobson, and Goddard
1999) adequately capture tenure’s complex influence. I find that dismissal hazard starts low, rises, then
plateaus for almost all groups. My results are similar in this sense to Kahn (2006) who finds a similar effect
for NBA head coaches, though while Kahn finds no significant racial effects, I reach the opposite
conclusion. And where Kahn concentrates on racial effects, I focus on the interplay between tenure and
institutional expectations.
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2.2 Literature
The executive dismissal literature consists of two strains: understanding why executives are dismissed,
and evaluating the effect of the dismissal on organizational performance. Sports data has been especially
useful in the latter area, as the effect of a particular coach can be isolated more easily than that of a
traditional business executive. Early examples of this second strain include Grusky (1963) and Allen,
Panian, and Lotz (1979) considering the effect of managerical succession in Major League Baseball, Pfeffer
and Davis-Blake (1986) in the National Basketball Association, and Brown (1982) in the National Football
League. The typical methodology here is to examine performance before and after a coaching change and
attempt to isolate the effect of the change. In general, coaching changes were found to have little effect,
though Pfeffer and Davis-Blake did find evidence that changing to a previously-successful coach was
beneficial. Each of these studies considered season-level data. Recently, a trend towards considering
match-level data has emerged, making it possible to consider the short-run impact of managerial change.
Examples in this vein include Audas, Dobson, and Goddard (2002) and Koning (2003), both of which use
association football data. While Koning finds no effect of intraseason managerial change after accounting
for schedule changes, Audas et al. find that intraseason dismissals decrease average performance but
increase variance, suggesting a motive for dismissal besides scapegoating.
The first strain has received less attention from researchers using sports data. Scully (1994) estimates
hazard functions for managers in US professional baseball, basketball, and football, finding that
managerial efficiency affects coaching tenure: the more efficient the manager (creating more wins with less
player resources) the higher his survival chances. Audas, Dobson, and Goddard (1999) use match-level
data to estimate job-termination hazard functions for English football. Fizel and D’itri (1997) use data
envelopment analysis to estimate the managerial efficiency of college basketball coaches, and relate this to
hiring and firing considerations. Madden (2004) considers the role of race in NFL coaching decisions by
comparing the performance of teams before and after hires. She demonstrates that the performance of
teams under black coaches is generally better, offering evidence that black coaches are held to a higher
standard than are white coaches, since a black coach must achieve superior results for hiring and retention.
The two essays most closely related to mine are Mixon and Trevin˜o (2004) and Kahn (2006). Mixon and
Trevin˜o (2004) consider discrete-time hazard functions for the dismissal of college football coaches, and
the effect of race on dismissal. They conclude that black coaches are less likely to be fired than white
coaches. The set of controls they employ is relatively limited, with tenure modelled only by a dummy
variable for the coach’s first year, and performance by only cumulative win percent and change in win
percent from last season to this season. Kahn (2006) uses a continuous-time hazard model with an
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extensive set of predictors to estimate dismissal hazard for NBA coaches, allowing “the impact of tenure
on separation. . . hazard. . . [to change] in a relatively flexible way over the life of a coaching spell.” (Kahn
2006 p.124). The pattern of dismissals is similar to what I find: low probability of dismissal in the first few
years, peaking around five years, then falling slowly. However Kahn finds that “there are no statistically
significant racial differences in exit, discharge, or quit outcomes...” (ibid, p. 130).
2.3 Data
Using college football data to investigate the dismissal of executives provides several advantages over
data drawn from other settings. Most obviously, the data I use are publicly available. I know who coaches
which team, how those teams have performed over their entire history, and the characteristics of the
schools and coaches involved. I know exactly when coaches are hired, and I know when a job separation
occurs. These are generally highly publicized, so I can almost always determine why the separation
occurred: did the coach leave voluntarily, and if not, was the coach separation for on- or off-field reasons.
Less obviously, the discrete nature of the football season presents a distinct modelling advantage. While a
business executive may be fired at any time of year, decisions about a coach’s continued employment are
generally made at the conclusion of a season, allowing us to know exactly what performance is attributed
to the coach and contributes to the retention decision.
An observation consists of a coach’s performance and attributes in a given season between 1983 and 2006,
along with historical performance and institutional characteristics that might affect the likelihood of the
coach being fired. As the dependent variable, I choose to examine whether or not an involuntary,
performance-related job separation occurred. This seems to be the most interesting aspect of job separation
to model. It seems pointless to try to model why a coach leaves his job voluntarily.1 It would also be
difficult to model why a coach was fired for off-field reasons. Each such situation would be unique—this
coach was fired for moral indiscretions, another for lying on his resume—and their departure would be
infeasible to model. It is better to examine only situations where a separation occurred, involuntarily on
the part of the coach, with the primary reason being on-field performance. Fortunately, we have reliable
accounts of why separations occurred in newspaper reports. This was my primary source for dismissal
data - in particular, the New York Times article archive 2 , which includes all NYT articles from 1981 to
present. In most cases, it was clear if a separation was involuntary and for performance reasons. In the
cases where it was not clear, I consulted several other online and print sources. In the rare case that this
1Fizel and D’itri (1997) consider voluntary departures of college basketball coaches, and find that only tenure is significant in
affecting voluntary separations.
2http://www.nytimes.com/ref/membercenter/nytarchive.html
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was not enough to make the determination, I omitted the observation. Note that my classification of
“involuntary and performance-based separation” includes resignations widely described as “forced” or
accompanied by statements from the coach to that effect. For clarity of exposition, I will refer to this as
being “fired” or “dismissed”. Out of 2507 observations, 196 represent dimissals in this sense. The period
of observation is 1983-2006, and includes every Division 1-A school except those that played primarily in
the Sun Belt conference, as insufficient records of coach dismissals were found for these schools.
I employ a set of independent variables 3 guided by the constructs in FHB: actual current organizational
performance, institutional expectations and attributions, incumbent power, and institutional allegiances and
values 4 . Current and past win percentages (both for the present coach and for the school) model team
performance and institutional expectations about performance. I also use a measure of player talent
(based on the NFL draftees generated in the current year 5) and strength of schedule6 to model the
school’s expectations. FHB’s “incumbent power” is modelled by the coach’s tenure at his current school: a
coach with a very long tenure is likely to have a great degree of control over his own job.7 On the other
hand, scandals reduce an incumbent’s power; NCAA sanctions for rules violations model this aspect. The
school’s allegiances and values are reflected in the effects of the coach’s record in important games—
against traditional rivals, and in bowl (postseason) games (measured as cumulative wins minus losses for
each). I also include the current-season in-conference win percent, as these games may be particularly
salient for the dismissal decision.8 I include whether the coach is black, and whether he previously
attended the school as a student, as variables through which the school’s values may be expressed. Finally,
I include a dummy variable for the first year of a new athletic director, since this may affect coach
retention. I summarize the explanatory variables in Table 2.1.
3In addition to the variables mentioned, the following were included in other specifications of the model and found to have
insignificant effects: age of coach, coach’s career wins or total games coached, whether the coach had recently won a national cham-
pionship or a national “coach of the year” award, performance in last game of season, number of bowl games attended, yearly trend,
conference within which school plays, performance of players in the subsequent year’s draft, and academic performance of the school
or its football players.
4Two considerations mentioned in FHB are absent: compensation and availability of alternative coaches. Data on compensation
(salary, contract length, buyout clauses, etc) are available for around half of current coaches, though even in these cases, other impor-
tant aspects of compensation such as remuneration for media relations are often missing. Compensation data for coaches from two
decades ago are considerably harder to obtain. I omit this, assuming that it is well proxied by the school’s historical record. Availabil-
ity of alternative coaches is certainly important—this may have been an important reason behind Tyrone Willingham’s dismissal, for
example—but the pool of potential coaches for coaching jobs is generally not available to researchers.
5The measure sums the value of a team’s players who enter the draft in the following year, counting a first round selection as 1/3,
a second round selection as 1/4, a third round selection 1/5, and so on. Since there is not a constant number of draftees each year (or
even a constant number of rounds) I normalize so that the total value of each draft is constant. This provided the best fit of several
draft value schemes considered.
6Strength of Schedule is calculated as it was in the Bowl Championship Series standings in the early 2000s: 2
3
(win percent of
opponents) + 1
3
(win percent of opponents’ opponents).
7Occasionally a coach leaves a school only to return later. For example, John Robinson was head coach at USC from 1976 to 1982,
left to coach the Los Angeles Rams of the NFL, then returned to USC from 1993 until he was fired in 1997. While his first stint at USC
is not included in my data, his second is, and so in his first year his tenure is recorded as 8.
8Conference records for teams with no conference are assumed to be identical to their overall records. Conference records in
previous seasons had no significant effect on dismissals.
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Table 2.1: List of explanatory variables and descriptive statistics
Variable Explanation Mean Std. Dev.
Win Percentt Win percent in current season 0.5151 0.2272
Win Percentt−1 Win percent one year ago 0.5152 0.2272
Win Percentt−2 Win percent two years ago 0.5150 0.2278
Win Percent(t−3)to(t−10) Win percent between three and ten years ago 0.5208 0.1624
Win Percent(t−11)to(t−30) Win percent between eleven and thirty years ago 0.5315 0.1300
Conference Win Percentt In-conference win percent this season 0.5118 0.2598
Strength of Schedule 2
3
win percent of opponents + 1
3
win percent of opponents’ opponents 0.5198 0.0385
Tenure The length of the coach’s tenure at the current school to date 5.49 5.21
Rival Record Cumulative record (wins minus losses) against the school’s major rival(s) 0.57 3.44
Bowl Record Cumulative record (wins minus losses) in bowl (postseason) games 1.35 2.57
Draft Value A measure of the teams’s performance in the nest year’s NFL draft 0.0095 0.0106
New AD Is there a new Athletic Director at the school? 0.14 0.34
Alumnus Did the coach attend the school as a student? 0.14 0.35
Black Is the coach black? 0.03 0.17
Infraction Is the NCAA imposing sanctions for a recent rules violation? 0.06 0.24
I obtained the historical results, identity of coaches, coach of the year awards, and NFL draftees from the
Collegio Football electronic media guide9. Athletic director identity and coach alma mater come from
NCAA Football Record Books 1982-2006, published annually by the National Collegiate Athletics
Association. NCAA sanctions for rules violations were identified from the NCAA Legislative Services
Database 10 . Identities of traditional football rivalries come from MacCambridge (2005) (see Appendix A).
I obtained a list of black coaches from sports business journalist and professor Jay Weiner11 and verified it
by examining photographs of coaches available on the internet. Of the 2507 observations, 362 represent
alumni head coaches, and 79 represent black coaches. In my sample, 78 NCAA sanctions were handed
down; due to the difficulty in pinning down exactly when the schools learn of the impending sanctions, I
model these as occurring in the year the sanction occurs and also in the previous year. Thus I consider 151
observations to be “infraction years”, as 5 of the sanctions occurred in the first year of my data set.
2.4 Model
A school’s decision regarding whether or not to fire its coach is complex and interesting. Imagine the
school as a Bayesian learner about the true ability θ of its current coach. It begins with some prior
distribution on the coach’s ability, then as it gains more information (i.e. the team plays more games) it
updates its posterior belief about θ. Once the expected benefit (given the posterior on θ) of retaining the
coach is sufficiently lower than the expected benefit of hiring a new coach, minus the transaction costs
(both financial and psychic) of firing and hiring, the team obtains a new coach.
9Available at http://www.sophosoft.com
10https://web1.ncaa.org/LSDBi/exec/homepage
11http://www.jayweiner.com
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For a simple parameterization of the learning process, consider the Beta-Binomial conjugate model. The
school’s prior belief about θ is
θ|α,β ∼ Beta(α, β)
where α and β can be roughly interpreted as the number of wins and losses the coach is initially given
credit for before starting at the school. Assuming that the chance of winning x out of n games is
Binomial(x, θ), we obtain the posterior belief about θ:
θ|α,β,x ∼ Beta(α+ x, β + n− x)
Posit a strictly increasing value function V (.) that assigns the schools value for each possible realization of
θ. Then the school’s value for keeping the coach given its posterior belief about his ability is
∫ 1
0
V (θ) dθ|α,β,x
which the school compares to the value for a new coach,
−c+
∫ 1
0
V (θ) dθ|α,β
with c the cost of hiring and firing, and assuming that the prior on ability for the new coach is the same as
for the old coach. As the coach wins and loses more games, the posterior distribution gets tighter around
the true ability θ, so that while initially a couple of bad seasons may not be sufficient for action (given
c > 0), continued poor performances will result in a strong enough belief about the coach’s ability to
justify dismissal.
Several difficulties in estimating such a procedure are immediate. First, the assumptions of the binomial
model are clearly violated in practice: the probability of success (winning) is hardly constant across the
sample. The quality of the opponents, the ability of the players, and the ability of the coach are not
constant. Second, as FHB suggest, the school’s value function is unlikely to be a trivial function of
performance (and hence ability). Each school has a unique history which presumably produces different
expectations of performance for its teams, and given the limited number of observations of each school,
we cannot hope to identify school-specific value functions. Third, some games may be more important
than others to the schools, so a single ability parameter may not adequately capture a coach’s usefulness
to the school. Finally, coaches may possess certain attributes which affect their chances of retention quite
apart from their coaching ability.
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An estimable version of this model must incorporate all of these aspects to be useful. Instead of the
structural approach above, I pursue a reduced-form approach in which I directly estimate the effects of the
above described aspects on the probability of dismissal. As in Mixon and Trevin˜o (2004), I assume there is
some unobservable variable y∗ describing the propensity of a college to fire its coach at the end of the
season; if y∗ > 0, the coach is fired (y = 1), otherwise y = 0. Let xijt denote the vector of exogenous
variables associated with coach i at college j in year t. Then
y∗ijt = xijtβ + uijt
where β is the vector of variables to be estimated. The distribution of the error term uijt is frequently
assumed to be logistic (as in Mixon and Trevin˜o 2004). 12 Assumptions about the distribution of the error
term lead to particular link functions, relating the linear predictor to the probability that a coach is fired.
Writing the link function as g(.), we obtain the following expression for the probability that coach i is fired
from college j at time t:
Pijt = P (Firedijt) = g(xijtβ)
A coach who is fired after exactly t years provides a lot of information; he was fired after exactly t years,
but he was not fired previously. Letting tij be the length of the fired coach’s tenure and assuming
independence, we have
P (T = tij) = Pijt
tij−1∏
k=1
(1− Pijk)
A coach whose tenure ends, but who is not fired, after exactly t years, also provides information about
tendencies to fire coaches. A similar circumstance arises at the end of the data set (after the 2006 season);
while most of the coach’s tenures did not end, our observations of them did. Letting t¯ij be the length of
such a coach’s tenure, we have
P (T = t¯ij) =
t¯ij∏
k=1
(1− Pijk)
Combining these probabilties over all coaches, universities, and years with valid observations, we obtain
an overall likelihood function
L(β|X) =
 ∏
ijt:Fired
Pijt
 ∏
ijt:Not Fired
(1− Pijt)

12I did not achieve superior fits either with a probit link function, or a more general class of link functions identified by Pregibon
(1980).
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Now we choose β to maximize this likelihood.
The assumption of independence deserves some attention. In order to multiply these probabilities, we
have assumed that each event is independent. This is unlikely to be completely accurate. Institutional
factors at particular schools may make them more or less likely to fire a coach; similarly, particular coaches
may possess unobserved attributes that make them more or less likely to be fired. I do not observe
contract details on each coach, and hence the buyout clauses that constitute a significant cost in replacing a
coach. A natural way to model these is with school and coach fixed (or possibly random) effects. However
adding 111 school effects (the number of schools in the sample) is infeasible; even worse, 366 coach effects.
We are left with assuming that any such effects are well proxied by the variables we do include. In
particular, to the extent that expectations are generated by prior results, school-specific effects should be
captured by historic win percent; and coach effects by the various coach characteristics—race,
alumni-status, record in bowl and rivalry games, and so on.
I estimate this model assuming a logit link function, labelling this Model 1. Estimating this model by
maximum likelihood I obtain the coefficients in the first column of Table 2.2. The McFadden’s Pseudo R2,
calculated as
1− log(L(full model))/log(L(null model))
is relatively high, at 42.78%. In particular, this compares favorably with the highest Pseudo R2 reported in
Mixon and Trevin˜o (2004) of 12.8%13.
2.5 Discussion
As the model is specified using a logit link function, the coefficients are interpreted as the effect of a
change in an independent variable on the log-odds of dismissal. For example, a strong record against
traditional rivals decreases the chance of being fired, with each additional win decreasing the log-odds by
0.158 (in Model 1). If a coach otherwise had a 10% chance of being fired, winning an additional game
against a traditional rival would decrease the chance to 8.67%; if the coach’s chance of being fired
otherwise were 50%, this would decrease the chance of dismissal to 46.06%.
The two most interesting results come from considering the effect of results and tenure on the probability
of dismissal. Results in the current season have a strong impact on the probability of dismissal. Additional
wins both overall and within-conference significantly decrease the probability of dismissal, as we would
expect. Similarly, additional wins last year and the year before also reduce the chance of dismissal.
13It is unclear what form of Pseudo R2 Mixon and Trevin˜o (2004) calculated.
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Table 2.2: Estimated coefficients for logistic regression models
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Sample Size 2507 2507 2507 2507
Number of Variables 28 23 24 25
Pseudo R2 0.4278 0.4174 0.4196 0.4195
Deviance 786.9 801.3 798.2 798.4
AIC 842.9 847.3 848.2 846.4
Intercept -15.8 *** -16.9 *** -14.7 *** -13.9 ***
(-6.32) (-6.74) (-6.11) (-6.11)
Win Percentt -5.85 *** -5.72 *** -5.77 *** -5.81 ***
(-5.72) (-5.71) (-5.69) (-5.72)
Win Percentt−1 -3.08 *** -2.88 *** -3 *** -3.01
(-5.03) (-4.79) (-4.95) (-5)
Win Percentt−2 -1.43 *** -1.62 *** -1.49 *** -1.43 ***
(-2.61) (-2.96) (-2.72) (-2.63)
Win Percent(t−3)to(t−10) 5.15 *** 4.98 *** 4.94 *** 5.14 ***
(5.55) (5.52) (5.43) (5.56)
Win Percent(t−11)to(t−30) 4.24 *** 4.07 *** 4.02 *** 4.15 ***
(4.4) (4.32) (4.22) (4.34)
Conference Win Percentt -2.22 *** -2.15 *** -2.17 *** -2.23 ***
(-2.79) (-2.73) (-2.73) (-2.82)
Strength of Schedule -1.44 -1.25 -1.5 -1.59
(-0.54) (-0.47) (-0.57) (-0.6)
Tenure 7.37 *** 8.06 *** 6.82 *** 6.27 ***
(5.94) (6.34) (5.77) (5.74)
Tenure2 -1.28 *** -1.42 *** -1.16 *** -1.05 ***
(-4.9) (-5.25) (-4.68) (-4.54)
Tenure3 0.0929 *** 0.104 *** 0.0829 *** 0.0734 ***
(4.17) (4.47) (3.93) (3.72)
Tenure4 -0.00239 *** -0.00273 *** -0.00211 *** -0.00184 ***
(-3.65) (-3.9) (-3.42) (-3.17)
Rival Record -0.158 *** -0.152 *** -0.155 *** -0.156 ***
(-3.94) (-3.82) (-3.87) (-3.93)
Bowl Record -0.0913 -0.114 -0.0892 -0.117
(-1.21) (-1.55) (-1.19) (-1.57)
Draft Value 32.9 ** 30.1 ** 32.8 ** 35.9 ***
(2.33) (2.16) (2.35) (2.6)
New AD 0.458 * 0.413 0.417 0.429 *
(1.76) (1.6) (1.61) (1.66)
Alumnus -38.1 *** -37.5 *** -38.5 ***
(-2.74) (-2.71) (-2.82)
Alumnus * Tenure 23.9 *** 23.6 *** 24.1 ***
(2.7) (2.68) (2.77)
Alumnus * Tenure2 -5.24 *** -5.18 *** -5.27 ***
(-2.63) (-2.62) (-2.69)
Alumnus * Tenure3 0.475 ** 0.47 ** 0.477 ***
(2.54) (2.53) (2.59)
Alumnus * Tenure4 -0.0152 ** -0.015 ** -0.0152 **
(-2.44) (-2.43) (-2.48)
Black 5.06 * 4.16 5.51 **
(1.94) (1.52) (2.1)
Black * Tenure -2.51 ** -2.26 * -2.69 **
(-2.13) (-1.83) (-2.25)
Black * Tenure2 0.309 ** 0.292 ** 0.324 **
(2.49) (2.24) (2.57)
Infraction 7.56 ** 8.9 *** 8.09 ***
(2.53) (2.96) (2.72)
Infraction * Tenure -4.25 ** -4.87 *** -4.54 **
(-2.29) (-2.61) (-2.44)
Infraction * Tenure2 0.754 ** 0.837 ** 0.797 **
(2.19) (2.41) (2.29)
Infraction * Tenure3 -0.0395 ** -0.0429 ** -0.0415 **
(-2.06) (-2.21) (-2.13)
t-statistics in parentheses
* Significant at 10% level. ** Significant at 5% level. *** Significant at 1% level.
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However the effect of wins in each of these three seasons is not equal. An additional conference win this
season (assuming a twelve-game schedule with eight conference games) would decrease the log-odds of
dismissal by 5.85 112 + 2.22
1
8 = 0.765, equivalent to reducing the chance of dismissal from 10% to 4.92%, or
from 50% to 31.76%. On the other hand, an additional win last season would decrease the log-odds of
dismissal by 3.08 112 = 0.257; so an additional (conference) win this season could offset three losses last
season. An additional win from two years prior decreases the log-odds of dismissal by 1.43 112 = 0.119, so
six losses from two seasons ago could be offset by a win this season.
Two effects underpin this pattern. On the one hand, recent performance is a stronger indicator of a coach’s
ability than is less recent performance. But on the other hand, prior wins raise the school’s expectations
about performance. Take the case of Tyrone Willingham at Notre Dame, referenced in the introduction to
this essay. While Willingham’s ten wins in his first season (of three) counted positively towards beliefs
about his ability as a coach, they also appear to have raised expectations, diminishing his chances of
survival. Thus the overall effect of wins from two years prior is the sum of a positive effect (raising beliefs
about the coach’s ability) and a negative effect (raising expectations about current performance).
Further evidence of the negative effect of prior good performance on current job security comes from the
variables Win Percentt−3−−t−10 and Win Percentt−11−−t−30. Both of these effects are negative: stronger
historic performances raise expectations about current performance, and a coach who doesn’t meet these
expectations faces the axe. Using again the examples from the introduction, there can be no doubt that
Notre Dame expects a higher win percent than does Memphis, as its historic record is stronger. Curiously,
schools seem not to care whether these wins were generated by the current coach or his predecessors.
Models allowing for differences between the source of the wins showed no significant differential
treatment of these historic records. Similarly, a coach’s career record (total wins or win percent) had no
additional impact on the probability of dismissal.
We can use this model to compare the rates of dismissal at schools of varying historical quality. Adding
the coefficients on the five win percent variables and the conference win percent variable, we find the sum
to be -3.11. Since this is negative, we observe that schools that win more games on average are less likely
to fire their coach when the coach achieves a historically average number of wins for that school. This is
hardly surprising; a coach who continues a tradition of losing is unlikely to be as popular or have as much
job security as a coach who continues a tradition of winning.
The second set of interesting results come when we consider the effect of tenure on dismissal. I use a
fourth-order polynomial to model the effect of tenure, along with interactions with the Black, Alumnus,
and Infraction variables. The effects are summarized in Figure 2.2; total effects on log-odds of dismissal are
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Figure 2.2: Relationship between tenure and log odds of dismissal for four groups of coaches; baseline is non-black,
non-alumnus, no NCAA infraction
given, with probabilities of dismissal for a coach with otherwise fixed characteristics shown for reference.
The baseline effect of tenure is for a non-black, non-alumnus coach with no recent NCAA rules violation.
Early in a baseline coach’s tenure, his chance of dismissal is low; it rises slowly, and plateaus around year
five. Since there are few observations of coaches past twelve years of tenure, I do not show these effects.
Models 2, 3, and 4 omit (respectively) the Alumnus, Black, and Infraction variables in order to consider their
effects as a group. Each is significant (from a likelihood ratio chi-squared test) with a p-value of less than
1%. Then logically there must be some point on the tenure spectrum where a coach with each attribute
faces a different probability of dismissal than the baseline coach. From Figure 2.2, this clearly does not
occur at tenures of around four to six years, since the effects are very similar in this timeframe. T-tests
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(using a two-sided alternative and a 10% significance level) for the difference between each of the three
effects and the baseline effect show that for alumni head coaches, the probability of dismissal is lower than
for non-alumni in only the first three years; from the fourth year on, alumni head coaches are
indistinguishable from non-alumni, in terms of probability of dismissal. For coaches committing an
NCAA rules violation, significant differences occur in the first two years and the eighth year; in these
years only, the probability of dismissal is significantly higher than for coaches without an infractions.
For black head coaches, the probability of dismissal is indistinguishable from that for white head coaches
for the first six years. However in years seven and eight, the probability of dismissal for black coaches is
significantly higher than that for white coaches. Indeed, no black coach has survived beyond eight years,
so we have no estimates beyond this for black coaches. This result lends credence to the theory that Tyrone
Willingham was not fired from Notre Dame in 2004 because he was black; I find no significant effect of
race for coaches with tenures shorter than seven years, and Willingham was fired after only three years.
Taken together, the effects of performance and tenure paint an intuitive picture of the nature of dismissals
of college football head coaches. On the one hand, coaches are constantly being evaluated against
expectations which change with time. Historical performance dictates appropriate levels for coaches to
live up to, and if they fail to meet those expectations, they are replaced. On the other hand, coaches are
generally given a grace period to establish themselves, with the effect of this grace period diminishing as
tenure increases. One effect can offset the other; a coach with early bad performances who improves is less
likely to be fired than one starts well then deteriorates; in this sense, the timing of performance is critical.
Consider a coach with a fixed number of wins to distribute over his first five years. According to this
evidence, if he had his choice, he would delay winning until later, as long as he could keep the risk of
dismissal sufficiently low early in his tenure. It would seem that that a coach would have little control
over this, especially with schedules being determined well in advance. However, two ways in which
coaches may affect the timing of wins are in redshirting and the implementation of style changes. In the
first case, we might expect to see coaches redshirt players (that is, have them sit out a season in order to
extend their eligibility later) more early in their tenure than later. A coach’s individual redshirting
preferences may trump this effect, however. In the second case, there is sometimes a drop in performance
when coaches implement a new style of play—changing from an option offense to a West Coast-style
offense, for example—as the players are typically more expert in their more practiced style of play. But a
coach who realizes that lower performances early in his tenure are unlikely to be penalized and may even
help his chance of retention would certainly make those changes immediately. From recent observation,
this latter case seems to be true—coaches do implement their changes as soon as possible—but it is not
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clear that there is any self-preservation aspect to it, so much as the simple desire to switch to their own
preferred style.
These performance and tenure effects have natural analogs for traditional executives. The predictions of
this model are that stronger performance (in whatever sense is appropriate) is rewarded with higher job
security only if it occurs in the most recent few years; stronger performance before this raises expectations
and lowers the chance of retention. However there is an initial period of learning—four years or so
here—in which coaches face a lower performance threshhold for retention. This performance threshold
varies according to the particular group considered; for example, alumni face a lower threshhold for
retention in the first few years. This is analogous to an “insider effect”—CEOs promoted from within
often face a lower chance of dismissal than do “outsiders’”; see, for example, Shen and Cannella (2002),
Zhang (2006), and Tsai, Hung, Kuo, and Kuo (2006), each of which identify favorable effects for
insiderness in, respectively, large publicly traded US corporations, Taiwanese family and non-family
firms, and publicly traded US manufacturing firms.
This alumni effect deserves attention, given that this appears to be the first essay to identify it within the
literature on the dismissals of sports executives. Several explanations are possible. Schools may obtain
some direct benefit from hiring an alumnus coach, in terms of favorable media exposure or a boost to
alumni relations, both of which may have favorable financial consequences. An alumnus may have
personal connections to decisionmakers at the school, making it more difficult to fire him. Alternatively,
an alumnus head coach may be better on average than a non-alumnus, as many coaches are attracted to
their alma mater even if they would gain employment at a more prestigious school. Whatever the
explanation, the data are clear: alumni receive an advantage in terms of probability of dismissal in their
first few years, but this effect disappears from four years onward.
I find several other characteristics of coaches, teams and schools to have an effect on the probability of
dismissal. I consider performance in games which may be of particular importance to the schools: games
against traditional rivals and bowl (postseason) games. I find that a strong record against a rival team
significantly lowers the chance of dismissal. However I do not find that a coach’s record in bowl games is
significant—a win in a bowl game is treated just the same as a win in a regular season game.
Two significant inputs to expected performance for a team are the strength of its players and the strength
of the opposition. I measure the former using a measure of performance in the subsequent season’s NFL
draft, described previously. We would expect a coach with stronger players to achieve a higher level of
performance; so holding constant performance, if player talent is higher, the coach’s performance is
worse. Then Draft Value has the correct sign: better performance in the NFL draft increases the probability
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of dismissal. 14 However, curiously, Strength of Schedule seems to have no effect on retention. We would
expect that a coach facing a stronger set of opponents would have a decreased chance of dismissal, all else
(including performance) being equal, but I find no evidence of this.
The last effect I measure is the effect of a new Director of Athletics at the school. This is the coach’s
immediate superior; a new boss may want to install his own people, including a new football coach. And
in fact, a new Director of Athletics does increase the log-odds of dismissal by 0.458, with significance at
the 10% level: this is equivalent to increasing the probability of dismissal from 10% to 14.94%, or from 50%
to 61.25%. However caution is warranted in interpreting this coefficient, for two reasons: a new athletics
director may be part of sweeping institutional changes which include the head football coach; and in the
1980s, there were still some schools at which the head football coach was the athletics director, so the
installation of a new football coach and a new athletics director necessarily went hand in hand.
2.6 Conclusions
Using data from 1983-2006, I have estimated dismissal probability for Division 1-A head football coaches.
Performance (as measured by recent win percentage) is an important determinant of dismissals. But as the
theoretical model presented by FHB predicts, I find strong evidence that the effect of performance is
mitigated by several factors including organizational expectations about performance, the values and
allegiances of the organization, and the power of the head coach as captured by tenure.
Schools learn about the ability of the coach by observing his performance. Strong current performance
unsurprisingly lowers the probability of dismissal. But schools also use recent historic performance to
evaluate the standard to which the coach should aspire. If the coach falls short of these standards, he faces
the axe. By using performance in both these manners, schools create an interesting situation in which
stronger performance only in the most recent three seasons helps a coach’s prospects of survival; stronger
performance before this actually diminishes the coaches chance of retention. This observation appears to be
new to the literature, but it is intuitive and its applicability to alternative situations should be easily
testable by accounting for the timing of performance in modelling.
I also show a way to model tenure so that we can account for the inclination to give coaches a chance to
prove themselves, while retaining the flexibility to account for differences in particular groups of interest.
14On the other hand, recruiting strong players is surely important. A retrospective measure like NFL draft performance is too coarse
to examine recruiting. A better approach is to use ratings of players entering teams. These are available for the entering classes
from 2002 onwards at http://recruiting.scout.com/. In one formulation of the model, I included a variable measuring the
percentage difference between current recruiting ratings and the average for the school, assigning zeroes to the years with no recruiting
data. The variable had the correct effect—higher than average recruiting decreasing the chance of dismissal—but it was not significant
at the 10% level in a one-sided test. With more data it seems likely that this approach would generate significant results.
36
Taking together the effects of performance and tenure, we see strong evidence learning behavior on the
part of schools: a coach must be particularly awful to warrant dismissal early, but as more evidence comes
in, the standards for retention rise.
I show that race has a limited but not insignificant effect on dismissals: black and white coaches face a
statistically identical chance of dismissal in the first six years, but after this black coaches are more likely to
be fired. There is no obvious reason why this should be so. I also identify an analog of the “insider effect”
from the CEO dismissal literature: alumni head coaches face a lower chance of dismissal, at least early in
their tenure, than do non-alumni coaches. The estimation of this effect in sports appears to be new; it
remains to be seen whether there is a similar effect in other college sports, or indeed in professional sports,
where former players may obtain greater institutional support. A similar effect may hold for assistant
coaches promoted to the head coaching position.
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2.7 College Football Rivalries
Determinations of college football rivalries are necessarily subjective. The ESPN College Football
Encyclopedia (MacCambridge 2005) contains a detailed entry for each Division 1-A team, including major
rival(s). Some teams had no rival considered worthy of exposition; some teams had rivals listed, but they
were described as unimportant. In these cases, I included no rivalry for such a team. Some schools had
multiple rivals listed, all of which were believed to be important; I included all such rivalries. Some
rivalries were described as non-reciprocal, and I allowed such entries.
As an example, consider the rivalries between the Air Force Academy, the Naval Academy (Navy), and
United States Military Academy (Army). The “Army-Navy Game” is one of the most storied rivalries in
college football, and each participant certainly considers its opponent its major rival. Air Force considers
Army and Navy its most important rivals, due to their annual matchups and the award of the
Commander in Chief’s Trophy to the winner of the annual triangular tournament. However the
importance of the Army-Navy rivalry overshadows those schools’ rivalries with Air Force (from their
perspective), so I classify Air Force as having non-reciprocal rivalries with Army and Navy.
Reciprocal Rivalries
Akron-Kent State Alabama-Auburn Arizona-Arizona State
Army-Navy Boise State-Idaho Bowling Green-Toledo
BYU-Utah California-Stanford Central Michigan-Western Michigan
Cincinnati-Miami (OH) Clemson-South Carolina Colorado State-Wyoming
Duke-North Carolina Florida-Florida State Fresno State-San Jose State
Georgia-Georgia Tech Indiana-Purdue Kansas-Missouri
Kansas-Kansas State Kentucky-Louisville LSU-Mississippi
Michigan-Ohio State Minnesota-Wisconsin Mississippi-Mississippi State
Nebraska-Oklahoma Nevada-UNLV New Mexico State-UTEP
Notre Dame-USC Oklahoma-Texas Oregon-Oregon State
Penn State-Pittsburgh Southern Methodist-TCU Texas-Texas A&M
Virginia-Virginia Tech Washington-Washington State
Non-reciprocal Rivalries
Air Force-Army Air Force-Navy Colorado-Nebraska
Georgia-Florida Georgia-Auburn Hawaii-BYU
Iowa-Minnesota Michigan State-Michigan UCLA-USC
For non-reicprocal rivalries, the team “feeling” the rivalry is listed first.
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Chapter 3
Day to Day with the NBA Superstars
3.1 Introduction
Attendance at sporting events is an integral part of the business model of professional sports. Gate and
concession revenues are critically important to franchise profits, and attendance is intrinsically linked with
merchandise sales and other stadium income. Attendance is also a key consideration for the public finance
of stadiums, with proponents of public funding citing the tourism and attendant community spending
that attendance at sporting events generates. Understanding attendance at sporting events is therefore of
great importance to sports researchers, and has generated substantial prior research.
A recent thrust of this research has been to understand the impact of star players on attendance, typically
using National Basketball Association (NBA) data, as the impact of an individual player can be seen most
readily in basketball where team sizes are relatively small. Star players impact attendance through two
avenues: their impact on their team’s ability, and the star power (fan following, media attention) they
possess. The first systematic study of the effect of star players on attendance appears to be Noll (1974),
examining season-level attendance at American professional sports games in the late 1960s and early
1970s. Noll found a considerable impact on NBA, American Basketball Association (ABA) and Major
League Baseball (MLB) home attendance for the number of star players employed by a team, defining star
players according to his “personal judgment” (page 117) based on coeval All Star Game appearances. Noll
showed that the first star a team employed garnered an extra 150,000 fans over the course of a season, and
the second star about half that, in an average-sized city of 3.5 million; though the only other variable
measuring team quality that Noll finds to be significant in predicting attendance is “Recent pennant win”,
suggesting that much of the additional attendance attributed to star power may have derived from the
desire to watch a winning team instead of a star player. For basketball, Noll claimed that a the first star
player on a team added 1650 fans per game (in a city of 2 million people) with further star players adding
around half that much. In the case of basketball, Noll did find an effect for team quality; though winning
an extra 10% of its games only increased attendance by about a third as much as its first star player.
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Noll’s results are surprising in their magnitude, and subsequent studies have suggested that they may be
at least in part due to Noll’s small sample size (season-level data for only two seasons) and the limited set
of explanatory variables that he used. Baade and Tiehen (1990) extended Noll’s analysis for MLB to the
period 1969-1987 and found star players to have about one-fourth the effect—the first star increasing
attendance by around 41,000 fans over a season, subsequent stars half that amount. In a modified model
in the same essay, the figure dropped to around 18711 extra fans per season per star, or around 231 per
game. Measuring team quality by the number of games out of first place, Baade and Tiehen found that an
extra game behind the season’s pennant winner decreased attendance by around 166 fans per game—that
is, on the same order as one extra star player.
Berri, Schmidt, and Brook (2004) found a qualitatively similar result for the NBA. Considering NBA
season-level home revenues from 1992-93 through 2003-04, they demonstrated that an additional win per
season increased home revenues by more on average ($238,000) than did the entire effect of a team’s star
power (measured through NBA All Star game vote totals) at around $200,0001.
If the evidence since Noll (1974) suggests that a player’s ability has much more effect on attendance than
his star power at home, the same cannot be said for road attendance. Star power is likely to have more
effect on the road, as fans rush to see the new sensation or old fan-favorite who is in town for only one
night. Berri and Schmidt (2006) consider aggregate NBA road attendance from 1992-93 to 1995-96 and find
the average number of fans attracted by a top 25 All Star vote earner to be 4353, compared with the
attendance generated by their playing ability (measured through Berri’s Wins Produced) of 9846.
DeSchriver (2007) also examines road attendance, concentrating on Freddy Adu’s first season with DC
United of Major League Soccer (MLS) in 2004. Despite Adu’s mediocre on-field performance, he was a
media sensation, attracting almost 11,000 extra fans per game.
Until recently, MLS teams were centrally owned, player contracts (including Adu’s) were held by the
league instead of individual teams, and revenues were shared throughout the league. If Adu or another
player generated additional revenues on the road, such revenues accrued to his employer, so there was no
externality problem. But the same cannot be said for the NBA, in which gate revenues accrue entirely to
the home team. If a team must play a premium to employ a star player, the benefit of his employment will
be enjoyed to a substantial degree by the remaining teams. As Berri and Schmidt (2006) point out, this
“superstar externality” has important consequences for league policy: in particular it diminishes the
argument for a salary cap. A team employing more and more (expensive) superstars benefits the other
teams also. The externality also has an impact on arguments for revenue-sharing, which traditionally
1Figures from Berri, Schmidt, and Brook (2006) page 76.
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moves revenues from high-revenue teams to low-revenue teams; a substantial road superstar externality
suggests revenue sharing in the reverse direction. A similar observation about externalities is made by
Hausman and Leonard (1997), who primarily examined television ratings for NBA games but also
presented a “less formal” (p 609) analysis of attendance. They find that ratings are substantially higher
when stars are playing. Using this and information on attendance and merchandise sales, Hausman and
Leonard claim the gaudy figure of $53 million as the externality generated by Michael Jordan for the
1991/92 season alone. Hausman and Leonard also present a mathematical model of profit maximization in
the presence of these externalities, and demonstrate that a tax and lump-sum redistribution scheme would
generate more short-run profits than the present salary cap scheme, though it is not clear that this would
hold in the long-run with the anticipated worsening of competitive balance and its effect on fan interest.
In this essay I extend the work of Berri and Schmidt (2006) and Hausman and Leonard (1997) by
examining game-level data. Game-level data has a considerable advantage for modelling sellouts (42.5%
of my data), and for exploring intra-season effects on attendance. When analyzing season-level data, the
distribution of stars may dramatically affect estimates of the effect of star power on attendance. Suppose
there are two teams, one strong (generating on average 90% attendance) and one weak (generating on
average 70% attendance). Suppose a star player generates an additional 20% attendance each game. Then
the star’s average effect is much larger if he plays on the weak team than on the strong team. Using
season-level data, then, allows the estimation of the effective superstar externality, which depends on the
distribution of talent. Using game-level data, and accounting for the censoring by using censored (Tobit)
regression, I can exploit the variability in attendance to estimate the potential superstar externality: how
much extra attendance stars would generate in the absence of capacity constraints. This estimate is largely
unaffected by the distribution of talent. The potential superstar externality is more relevant for
league-design questions, considering how talent ought to be distributed in order to maximize league
attendance.
Naturally, the qualitative results expressed in Berri and Schmidt (2006) still hold: star players increase
attendance beyond their contribution to team ability. However the more detailed data I employ allow me
to consider the source of the increased attendance: does the increased attendance come out of thin air, or
does it draw from adjacent games? If the latter is true then any superstar externality effect may be
nullified. I show that the adjacent-game substitution effect is significant but small, generally reducing
attendance in adjacent games by less than 5% of the direct effect on attendance of stardom. Further, I can
account for variations in schedule that may affect estimates of the effects of star players; in so doing, I
obtain much more precise estimates of the effects of stardom on attendance.
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I also reconsider the measurement of stardom, an integral aspect of a study of star effects on attendance.
While some studies define a simple count (e.g. Noll (1974) and Baade and Tiehen (1990)) or indicator (e.g.
Hausman and Leonard (1997) and DeSchriver (2007)) variable for stars, it is better to try to quantify the
degree of stardom. Berri and Schmidt (2006) uses All Star votes and a star’s effect on win percent; I
examine both of these, and an alternative measure of stardom, All-NBA Team selections. I demonstrate
that the All Star vote method is superior to the All-NBA Team method, and retain the effect on win
percent as a companion measure of stardom.
3.2 Data
The data cover the 2004-05 through 2007-08 NBA regular seasons. Each of the 30 teams plays 41 home
games per regular season, so 1230 games are available per season. Attendance figures are available for
almost all of these; eleven games are missing over these four seasons (eight in 2004-05 and three in
2006-07). The attendance figures are the official figures reported on espn.com and nba.com. While official
figures are the only reasonable option (no other publicly available attendance records exist) they are not
without problems. For one, these figures include both paid and freely distributed tickets. This is not
automatically problematic, if the number of freely distributed tickets is constant across the games; but this
seems unlikely, as teams are more likely to freely distribute tickets to lightly-attended games. Similarly,
when the tickets are sold, pricing decisions are naturally strategic, and take into account expected
attendance. Both of these effects (strategic free ticket distribution and ticket pricing) will bias downward
the effect of star players on attendance, as the games played by the stars receive additional attendance,
and therefore less padding. Therefore the effects I calculate are conservative estimates of star power.
The principle econometric issue with the attendance data is that of sellouts. Not only do some games sell
out, giving a censored attendance figure, we have to determine which games sell out. While some teams
apparently have a hard limit (home attendance for the Los Angeles Lakers was 18997 for 143 out of 164
games over the sample, and never higher than 18997) this is not always the case. For example, the Miami
Heat list attendance as 19600 for 81 out of 164 home games, with at least 8 such games each season.
However attendance is over this 64 times, with no other attendance figure being repeated more than three
times, and only five repeats total within those 64 games. As discussed in Coates and Humphreys (2005)
there are two likely explanations for the above-capacity attendance: standing room only sales, and
expanded luxury box seating. The room for expansion in each of these areas varies from arena to arena,
due to logistics and municipal code restrictions, so there is no standardization across the league. I consider
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Table 3.1: Summary of 2004-05 to 2007-08 NBA attendance figures
Home Team Nominal Average Games Below Games At Games Above
Capacity Attendance Capacity Capacity Capacity
Atlanta Hawks 18729-19445 15324 145 5 13
Boston Celtics 18624 17092 85 79 0
Charlotte Bobcats 19026-23319 15253 145 10 8
Chicago Bulls 21711 21451 42 0 121
Cleveland Cavaliers 20562 19839 64 100 0
Dallas Mavericks 20000 20204 10 0 153
Denver Nuggets 19099-19155 17347 114 21 29
Detroit Pistons 22076 22076 0 164 0
Golden State Warriors 19596 18085 107 26 31
Houston Rockets 18000 16442 84 0 80
Indiana Pacers 18345 15189 137 27 0
Los Angeles Clippers 19060 17355 130 12 22
Los Angeles Lakers 18997 18915 21 143 0
Memphis Grizzlies 18119 15020 137 27 0
Miami Heat 19600 19756 19 81 64
Milwaukee Bucks 18717 15982 150 14 0
Minnesota Timberwolves 19356-19420 15960 158 3 3
New Jersey Nets 19990-20098 16147 151 11 1
New Orleans/OKC Hornets 18500-19164 16104 132 17 14
New York Knicks 19763 19086 65 98 0
Orlando Magic 17283-17519 16135 91 73 0
Philadelphia 76ers 21600 16041 163 0 0
Phoenix Suns 18422 18090 38 126 0
Portland Trail Blazers 19818-21538 16896 162 2 0
Sacramento Kings 17317 16526 38 126 0
San Antonio Spurs 18797 18572 37 127 0
Seattle Supersonics 17072 15486 124 39 0
Toronto Raptors 19800 17977 98 59 7
Utah Jazz 19911 19138 81 80 2
Washington Wizards 20173 17629 93 70 0
Sums 2821 1540 548
games with attendance at or above capacity to be sold out, hence censored; I treat the actual attendance as
the censoring value.2 By this definition, around 42.5% of games (2088 out of 4909) sell out. Capacity
occasionally changes from year to year—for example, Orlando’s Amway Arena expanded from 17283 to
17451 seats, and again to 17519, while New Jersey’s Continental Airlines Arena contracted from 20098 to
20032 seats, then again to 19990. Table 3.1 describes the attendance from 2004-05 to 2007-08. Where the
capacity changed over the sample, I list the range of capacities.
2Determining stadium capacity is not always trivial. For example, the Houston Rockets list capacity of the Toyota Center as 18300.
However they have attendance between 18000 and 18300 67 times over the sample, including occurrences of 18003, 18005, and 18007;
yet attendance between 17000 and 18000 occurs only 9 times. No attendance figure is repeated more than once between 17000 and
18300. This pattern cannot have happened by chance. I treat the capacity of the Toyota Center as 18000, so all games above this sell
out (and are treated as censored). Since treating attendance as censored when it is not is relatively innocuous, this is the direction in
which I err.
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In examining the effects of star power, we must first consider how to measure star power. A popular
player is surely a star, and we have a ready measure of popularity: votes cast for the NBA All Star Game.
For around two months at the beginning of each season, fans vote for players to represent the Eastern and
Western Conference All Star teams. Following Berri, Schmidt, and Brook (2006), Berri and Schmidt (2006),
and Berri, Schmidt, and Brook (2004) I use the number of votes accruing to the top five centers, top ten
forwards, and top ten guards in each conference.
Another definition of stardom is whether a player is one of the best in the league. After each season, a
panel of media representatives votes for the best players in the league to be honored with First, Second, or
Third Team All-NBA status. Fifteen players each year therefore are given this honor—generally three
centers, six forwards, and six guards. I use these awards as a second measure of stardom.
A third definiton of stardom is whether a player helps his team to win. To capture this third definition, I
consider the effect of a team’s win percent on attendance, and then assign some fraction of this effect
based on the player’s contribution to his team’s win percent, measured using the Wins Produced metric3
as outlined in Berri, Schmidt, and Brook (2006). Since I want to capture fan’s beliefs about team ability, I
use the team’s win percent from the previous season at the start of a season; then a weighted average of
the previous season’s win percent and the current season’s current win percent for the first half of the
season (weighted according to the number of games played this season); then the current season’s current
win percent for the remainder of the season.
Table 3.2 shows that there is not broad agreement among these measures as to who are the stars in the
NBA; nineteen players are in the top ten of at least one of the categories, with only four players in the top
ten of all three. Previous studies have generally considered either the first or the second measure for a
player’s popularity in addition to some measure like the third; I will contrast the results between the first
two measures while employing the third as well.
A study of attendance is a natural place to consider customer racial preferences in the NBA. If fans prefer
to see members of a particular race play, we would expect to see this in road attendance: a team with a
higher proportion of the “right type” of players will generate higher attendance on the road. I consider the
fraction of minutes for each team over each season played by non-black and foreign players. I determine
these classifications using photos and biographical details on http:\\www.nba.com. To isolate any
racial or national effect, I adjust for playing style by including Pace Factor as an explanatory variable. Pace
3Wins Produced assigns values to each of the following statistics attributable to a player: Two- and three-point field goals, both
made and attempted; free throws made and attempted; offensive and defensive rebounds; and steals, turnovers, blocks and assists
(with the latter two adjusted for team quality). It also attributes a fraction of opponents’ free throws made, according to the percentage
of personal fouls that are attributable to the player. Finally, it makes adjustments for team defensive ability and position played. Berri
has an excellent primer on the calculation available at http://www.wagesofwins.com/CalculatingWinsProduced.html
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Table 3.2: Top ten star players according to each star power metric
Player Name All Star All-NBA Wins Produced
Vote Rank Award Rank Rank
Gilbert Arenas 20 10= 29
Kobe Bryant 3 3= 11
Marcus Camby 28 NR 9
Vince Carter 10 NR 26
Tim Duncan 9 3= 8
Kevin Garnett 6 7= 1
Dwight Howard 15 10= 5
Allen Iverson 7 10= 38
LeBron James 2 3= 6
Jason Kidd 18 NR 3
Shawn Marion 31 18= 2
Tracy McGrady 5 10= 68
Yao Ming 1 10= 34
Steve Nash 11 1= 4
Dirk Nowitzki 13 1= 7
Shaquille O’Neal 4 7= 47
Amare Stoudemire 19 6 22
Dwyane Wade 8 9 19
Ben Wallace 16 15= 10
All-NBA Award rank is based on the 2004/05 - 2007/08 seasons, assigning 3 points for a first team selection, 2 for a
second team selection, and 1 for a third team selection. NR indicates no All-NBA honors over this period.
factor is an estimate of the number of possessions employed by a team—a higher number indicates a more
exciting style, and presumably more fan attendance.
I also include CHM20, a variable first presented in Berri and Brook (1999), which measures a team’s
historical achievement by awarding points for NBA championships won in the last 20 years. The
champion from the previous year earns 20 points, the champion from the year before that, 19, and so on.
For example, for the 2005-06 season, the CHM20 score for the Detroit Pistons is 28, comprised of 19 points
for their championship in 2003-04, and 4 and 5 points for their championships in 1988-89 and 1989-90
respectively.
The remainder of the data on schedules, game results, and so on comes from
http://www.databasebasketball.com. Descriptive statistics are given in Table 3.3, and further
description is given in the next section.
Model
Censoring due to sellouts suggests a censored regression (Tobit) model. I consider games at or above
nominal capacity to be censored. I assume errors are normal and independent of the regressors. The
45
Table 3.3: Descriptive statistics by year
Variable 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08
Home Team Variables
Games Behind 5.673 (10.47) 4.214 (7.062) 3.6 (6.23) 6.253 (11.944)
Games Ahead 4.408 (7.536) 4.691 (9.111) 5.069 (9.015) 4.433 (8.557)
Visiting Team Variables
Votes (in millions) 1.28 (1.257) 1.313 (1.268) 1.47 (1.342) 0.603 (0.615)
All-NBA First Team Members 0.168 (0.374) 0.167 (0.373) 0.167 (0.454) 0.167 (0.373)
All-NBA Second Team Members 0.166 (0.373) 0.167 (0.454) 0.167 (0.454) 0.167 (0.454)
All-NBA Third Team Members 0.166 (0.373) 0.167 (0.373) 0.166 (0.372) 0.167 (0.454)
Win Percent 0.5 (0.152) 0.5 (0.134) 0.5 (0.13) 0.5 (0.166)
Nonblack Minutes 0.219 (0.135) 0.214 (0.11) 0.197 (0.107) 0.211 (0.108)
Foreign Minutes 0.119 (0.087) 0.139 (0.09) 0.137 (0.106) 0.145 (0.111)
Pace Factor 90.935 (2.417) 90.53 (2.279) 91.916 (2.483) 92.387 (3.113)
CHM20 7.003 (16.91) 7.000 (16.778) 6.997 (15.452) 7.000 (16.162)
Schedule Variables
Home Prev Games 40.565 (23.676) 40.474 (23.681) 40.438 (23.671) 40.482 (23.723)
First Home Game 0.024 (0.152) 0.024 (0.154) 0.024 (0.157) 0.024 (0.154)
Last Home Game 0.025 (0.155) 0.024 (0.154) 0.024 (0.155) 0.024 (0.154)
Double Weekend 0.179 (0.384) 0.194 (0.396) 0.167 (0.373) 0.185 (0.388)
Games Next Week 1.485 (0.867) 1.487 (0.874) 1.482 (0.846) 1.459 (0.858)
Games Prev Week 1.485 (0.867) 1.487 (0.874) 1.482 (0.846) 1.459 (0.858)
Next Week Exact 0.266 (0.442) 0.263 (0.44) 0.28 (0.449) 0.25 (0.433)
Next Week Exact * Win Percent 0.13 (0.23) 0.13 (0.228) 0.138 (0.231) 0.124 (0.231)
Next Week Exact * Votes 0.318 (0.842) 0.342 (0.860) 0.41 (0.952) 0.139 (0.389)
Prev Week Exact 0.266 (0.442) 0.263 (0.44) 0.28 (0.449) 0.25 (0.433)
Prev Week Exact * Win Percent 0.134 (0.236) 0.129 (0.226) 0.138 (0.232) 0.125 (0.231)
Prev Week Exact * Votes 0.373 (0.897) 0.328 (0.831) 0.404 (0.934) 0.152 (0.402)
46
model can be written
ATT ∗it = f(HomeTeamAttributes, T ime, Schedule, V isitingTeamAttributes) + ε (3.1)
with ATT ∗it representing the predicted attendance with no capacity constraints. Observed attendance is
given by
ATTit = min(ATT ∗it, Capacityit) (3.2)
I do not attempt to model every home team attribute. I include a fixed effect for each home team, which
should account for variation in demand across teams. Prices are more or less constant across the regular
season—even if ticket prices vary slightly, ancillary costs of attending games like concessions and travel
are likely stable—so the fixed effect can account for these. Fixed-effects also absorb location-specific effects
like arena age and quality that are stable across a given year. However demand within a season is unlikely
to be constant even after adjusting for visiting team attributes, so I include the number of games the home
team has already played (Home Prev Games), allowing this effect to vary across the season or not according
to the model specification. I also include the team’s position in the playoff race (number of games ahead or
behind the eighth placed team, Games Ahead or Games Behind), and fixed effects for day of the week. A
team’s current schedule also affects its attendance: I include the number of home games in the next seven
days and in the previous seven days (Games Next Week and Games Prev Week), anticipating that higher
values of each of these will decrease attendance due to substitution. I also consider the effect of games
exactly one week ahead or behind (Next Week Exact or Prev Week Exact); such games may be particularly
relevant to attendance decisions, as a fan able to go to a game this (say) Friday night may be just as able to
go to a game next Friday night. I will refer to these four variables as measuring a substitution effect. I also
include a fixed effect for the first home game of the season, as such games invariably attract larger
attendance and a fixed effect for the last (regular season) home game of the season also.
The visiting team’s attributes are most important to model, given the goal to consider road attendance. I
model visiting team quality with its rolling win percent (Win Percent) as defined in the previous section,
expecting a better team to draw more attendance. Expecting a more exciting team to draw more
attendance, I include the visiting team’s current season Pace Factor. CHM20 measures the following a
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winning team accrues over the years; higher values should increase attendance. The racial and national
character of the visiting team is captured by the fraction of minutes played by nonblacks and foreigners
(Nonblack Min and Foreign Min respectively).
Model 1 includes the variables described in addition to day of week dummies and dummies for each
home team and year interaction. Where Model 1A includes variables measuring the number of All-NBA
team members on the visiting team, Model 1B measures the number of All Star game votes (normalized to
2007-08 levels). This naming convention continues for Models 2 and 3. Model 1C interacts the schedule
variables with All Star votes instead of Win Percent; the interaction with Win Percent is substantially more
successful. Models 2 and 3 differ from Model 1 in the within-season linear attendance trends allowed: in
Model 1, I allow no trend, whereas in Model 2 I allow a trend for each team that I force to be identical from
season to season, and in Model 3 I allow the trend to vary from season to season. I obtain the best results
with Model 3B, and that is the model I will refer to in the discussion.
Autocorrelation is naturally a concern with panel data. To test whether I have first-order autocorrelation, I
split the residuals from Model 3 into 120 team-year subsets and computed the Ljung-Box test statistic
(Ljung and Box 1978) for each subset:
Q = T (T + 2)r2/(T − 1)
with T the number of (non-censored) observations in each subset and r the autocorrelation coefficient. If I
restrict to only the team-year combinations with no censored observations, just one out of 12 shows
significant autocorrelation at the 5% level. If I extend to the 40 team-year combinations with at least 35
non-sellouts, still only one shows significant autocorrelation. I conclude that there is no significant
residual autocorrelation in the data.
3.3 Alternative Models
In the introduction I argued that examining game-level data rather than season-level, and accounting for
censoring due to sellouts, allows for the estimation of the potential superstar externality—that is, the
extent to which star players would raise road attendance if no capacity constraints existed. To
demonstrate this further, I will now present two alternative models: a season-level OLS model using the
same technique as Berri and Schmidt (2006) and an OLS model of attendance using game-level data (not
accounting for sellouts). Model 4A presents the results from aggregated season-level data; naturally, the
number of control variables is significantly reduced, as I cannot retain the effects that vary across the
48
Table 3.4: Estimated coefficients for censored regression models; dependent variable is attendance
Variable Model 1A Model 1B Model 1C Model 2A Model 2B Model 3A Model 3B
Games Behind -35.92 *** -36.94 *** -36.97 *** -27.78 *** -29.45 *** -48.34 *** -55.53 ***
(-4.74) (-4.72) (-4.73) (-3.63) (-3.73) (-3.5) (-4.13)
Games Ahead 70.14 *** 72.1 *** 72.36 *** 91.17 *** 94.87 *** 94.64 *** 100.84 ***
(4.66) (4.82) (4.85) (5.46) (5.7) (4.48) (4.83)
Votes (in millions) 474.42 *** 473.74 *** 482.04 *** 496.76 ***
(13.35) (13.33) (13.63) (13.81)
All-NBA First Team Members 980.45 *** 987.9 *** 1017.97 ***
(9.21) (9.47) (9.89)
All-NBA Second Team Members 641.57 *** 653.94 *** 659.63 ***
(7.53) (7.85) (8.24)
All-NBA Third Team Members 477.49 *** 474.44 *** 457.15 ***
(5.53) (5.68) (5.54)
Win Percent 1928.54 *** 2201.02 *** 2215.54 *** 1905.09 *** 2170.91 *** 1936.79 *** 2181.64 ***
(7.26) (8.93) (9) (7.39) (8.88) (7.56) (8.83)
Nonblack Min -141.83 -426.03 -423.56 -111.6 -394.65 -139.42 -419.13
(-0.43) (-1.29) (-1.29) (-0.35) (-1.24) (-0.45) (-1.35)
Foreign Min -1483.79 *** -1376.27 *** -1389.25 *** -1501.65 *** -1390.98 *** -1600.64 *** -1462.58 ***
(-3.6) (-3.36) (-3.39) (-3.68) (-3.44) (-3.97) (-3.65)
Pace Factor 29.43 ** 57.15 *** 57.42 *** 31.69 ** 59.47 *** 25.82 * 54.23 ***
(2.15) (4.33) (4.35) (2.39) (4.66) (1.96) (4.26)
CHM20 23.04 *** 19.45 *** 19.44 *** 22.72 *** 18.99 *** 23.31 *** 19.35 ***
(10.21) (8.9) (8.92) (10.22) (8.88) (10.74) (9.25)
Home Prev Games 30.3 *** 30.22 *** 30.22 *** 44.02 *** 45.59 *** 104.12 *** 114.53 ***
(14.69) (14.56) (14.6) (3.73) (3.82) (3.31) (3.81)
First Home Game 3131.97 *** 3183.13 *** 3186.75 *** 3243.18 *** 3294.66 *** 3294.23 *** 3348.74 ***
(10.98) (10.98) (11.01) (11.14) (11.2) (11.12) (11.34)
Last Home Game 745.62 *** 757.37 *** 760.89 *** 768.34 *** 784.01 *** 936.22 *** 957.98 ***
(3) (3.03) (3.04) (3.41) (3.45) (4.64) (4.78)
Double Weekend -157.13 * -172.56 ** -171.72 * -135.36 -149.79 * -131.87 -143.75 *
(-1.82) (-1.97) (-1.96) (-1.6) (-1.77) (-1.52) (-1.65)
Games Next Week -290.36 *** -277.33 *** -276.15 *** -281.7 *** -269.97 *** -262.9 *** -250.93 ***
(-6.99) (-6.79) (-6.76) (-6.92) (-6.77) (-6.24) (-6.1)
Games Prev Week -376.26 *** -363.75 *** -363.6 *** -370 *** -358.29 *** -354.26 *** -341.61 ***
(-9.24) (-8.96) (-8.97) (-9.18) (-8.93) (-8.85) (-8.62)
Next Week Exact 506.85 ** 503.27 ** 508.16 ** 504.37 ** 524.95 *** 526.78 ***
(2.42) (2.43) (2.51) (2.53) (2.66) (2.69)
Next Week Exact * Win Percent -522.28 -583.56 -531.24 -587.61 -556.9 -624.01 *
(-1.35) (-1.52) (-1.4) (-1.57) (-1.49) (-1.67)
Next Week Exact * Votes 1.47
(0.03)
Prev Week Exact 407.73 ** 350.94 * 443.11 ** 385.23 * 437.27 ** 377.3 *
(1.97) (1.73) (2.19) (1.94) (2.15) (1.9)
Prev Week Exact * Win Percent -334.21 -263.86 -430.82 -355.5 -412.41 -330.21
(-0.85) (-0.69) (-1.13) (-0.96) (-1.08) (-0.88)
Prev Week Exact * Votes -12.16
(-0.24)
Day of Week fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Home Team * Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Home Team slopes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Home Team * Year slopes Yes Yes
Log-Likelihood -25765.2 -25731.4 -25732.6 -25690.0 -25653.4 -25535.3 -25490.9
Maddala Pseudo R2 73.69% 74.05% 74.04% 74.49% 74.87% 76.05% 76.48%
McKelvey-Zavoina Pseudo R2 84.73% 85.04% 85.04% 88.97% 89.23% 95.25% 95.53%
t-statistics in parentheses using robust standard errors clustered on Day of Week and Home Team * Year
* Significant at 10% level. ** Significant at 5% level. *** Significant at 1% level.
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Table 3.5: Comparison of alternative models; dependent variable is attendance or per-game attendance
Variable Model 3B Model 4A Model 4B Model 5
Votes (in millions) 497.76 *** 288.00 *** 261.06 *** 284.19 ***
(13.81) (7.43) (5.82) (14.24)
Win Percent 2181.64 *** 705.26 *** 919.44 *** 1247.84 ***
(8.83) (2.18) (3.02) (7.55)
t-statistics in parentheses
* Significant at 10% level. ** Significant at 5% level. *** Significant at 1% level.
season. Model 4B performs the same analysis using visiting-team fixed effects (i.e. fixed effects for each
team across the four seasons) mimicking Berri and Schmidt (2006). Models 4A and 4B use the season’s
actual win percent rather than the rolling win percent used in the models with game-level data. Model 5
reverts to game-level data, analyzing the data with OLS rather than censored regression. The relevant
coefficients for Votes and Win Percent are presented in Table 3.5.
It is clear from Table 3.5 that the superstar externality is greater when accounting for censoring (Model 3B)
than when ignoring it (Model 5). By how much should it be greater? Sellouts occur in 42.5% of games, so
in the model that ignores censoring, star players appear to have no effect in 42.5% of the games; so the
measured effect should be around 42.5% lower in the OLS model (Model 5) than in the censored regression
model (Model 3B). And it is: the coefficients on Votes and Win Percent 42.91% lower and 42.80% lower in
Model 5 than in Model 3B. A bias-correction calculation would work if we only knew the percentage of
censored games, but not which games were censored, and we computed OLS estimates of attendance.
As long as game-level data are available, using them seems more appropriate than using aggregated
season-level data. Using season-level data (as in Berri and Schmidt (2006)) we cannot account for obvious
effects on attendance such as home team performance (attendance rises when the home team is doing
well), which becomes more problematic the more unbalanced the schedules. Further, we cannot estimate
interesting intra-season scheduling effects—not only the superstar substitution effect, but also simple
attendance effects of closely scheduled games, increased attendance in home-openers, and so on. Again,
these effects will not necessarily cancel out if schedules are not completely balanced.
Given the weaknesses of using aggregated season-level data, it is not surprising that the estimates of the
effect of Win Percent in the season-level models (Models 4A and 4B) are not identical to those from the
simple OLS regression (Model 5). The differences are not significant, but that is largely because of the lack
of precision of season-level estimates; 95% confidence intervals for the effect of Win Percent in Models 4A
and 4B are [63.8, 1346.8] and [313.4, 1525.5] respectively. Game-level models seem superior to season-level
models not only because of the ability to account for sellouts, but also because of the added precision of
estimates of the variables of interest.
50
3.4 Discussion
The Tobit regression results confirm the findings in Berri and Schmidt (2006) and Hausman and Leonard
(1997): star power appears to be an important factor in attendance decisions, taking into account playing
ability. A visiting team with an additional 1.166 million All Star votes (the average number per team)
draws on average 579 extra fans to its games4, assuming that the game is not already sold out. A stronger
team is also a stronger draw at the gate: a visiting team that wins 10% more of its games draws an
additional 218 fans.
Several of the schedule terms affect attendance. Each home game in the next week and previous week
decrease attendance on average by 251 and 342 fans respectively. Closely scheduled games serve as
substitutes, decreasing demand for one another. However games exactly a week away behave differently.
Games exactly a week prior seem to have little effect: we can calculate their average effect as
Effect = βGamesPrevWeek + βPrevWeekExact + βPrevWeekExact∗WinPercent ∗ ¯WinPercent
= -341.61 + 377.30 + -330.21 * 0.5
= -129.41
which is small and not significant. A game a week ahead affects attendance today on average by
Effect =βGamesNextWeek + βNextWeekExact + βNextWeekExact∗WinPercent ∗ ¯WinPercent
= -250.93 + 526.78 + -624.01 * 0.5
= -36.16
which is again small and not statistically significant. But while the effect of strong teams a week ago is
negligible (as βPrevWeekExact∗WinPercent is not significant) the effect of strong teams a week ahead is
significant: a team with a .800 win percent would decrease fans at the current game by around 223, while a
.200 team coming to town next week would increase attendance at the current game by around 151 fans. So
while strong teams (and hence star players) have little average effect, this is because strong teams in
adjacent games decrease current attendance while weak teams increase attendance, via a substitution effect.
It would take the a particularly strong player to bring about much of an effect via this substitution effect,
but such players do exist: over the four years in my sample, there are 15 player-year combinations in
which the player produces 20 or more wins; an additional 20 wins increases season win percent by 0.244,
and hence decreases attendance at the previous week’s game by 624.01 ∗ 0.244 = 152.3.
Now we are in a position to calculate a star’s overall effect on attendance, through three avenues: his
effect on win percent (measured through Berri’s Wins Produced metric), his star power (as measured
4Using All-NBA selections as a measure of stardom (i.e. Model 3A) yields a smaller result: the average team has one sixth of a first,
second, and third team All-NBA player, drawing 356 fans per game through its star power.
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Table 3.6: Per-game average effects on road attendance of 19 NBA star players, 2004-05 to 2007-08
Four Year Totals Per-Game Attendance Effect
Wins All Star Adjacent Wins All Star Adjacent
Player Name Produced Votes Games Produced Votes Games Total
Gilbert Arenas 37.53 2532459 40 196 303.5 -17.4 482.1
Kobe Bryant 59.2 7168076 43 309.1 859.1 -29.5 1138.7
Marcus Camby 65.02 1707489 42 339.5 204.6 -31.7 512.4
Vince Carter 39.48 5017109 52 206.2 601.3 -23.8 783.7
Tim Duncan 65.23 5489961 34 340.6 658 -25.7 972.9
Kevin Garnett 93.01 6369851 48 485.7 763.4 -51.8 1197.3
Dwight Howard 76.05 2948908 46 397.1 353.4 -40.6 709.9
Allen Iverson 35.29 5980535 43 184.3 716.8 -17.6 883.5
LeBron James 73.14 7390683 51 381.9 885.8 -43.3 1224.4
Jason Kidd 87.5 2668055 52 456.9 319.8 -52.8 723.9
Shawn Marion 92.44 1341633 32 482.7 160.8 -34.3 609.2
Tracy McGrady 24.45 6418556 40 127.7 769.2 -11.3 885.6
Yao Ming 36.61 8166039 40 191.2 978.7 -17 1152.9
Steve Nash 76.85 4997824 32 401.3 599 -28.5 971.8
Dirk Nowitzki 67.59 3436152 35 352.9 411.8 -27.4 737.3
Shaquille O’Neal 31.28 6769369 37 163.3 811.3 -13.4 961.2
Amare Stoudemire 44.84 2583728 32 234.2 309.7 -16.6 527.3
Dwyane Wade 48.42 5502907 37 252.8 659.5 -20.8 891.5
Ben Wallace 60.93 2936336 39 318.2 351.9 -27.6 642.5
An ”Adjacent Game” is a game exactly one week prior, with the same home team.
Average effects for adjacent games are given over the full season (i.e. 41 road games).
through All Star votes), and the substitution effect. Table 3.6 describes these three effects for each of the 19
stars identified in table 3.2. The players with the greatest effect on attendance over this period are LeBron
James (1224 fans per game), Kevin Garnett (1197), Yao Ming (1153), and Kobe Bryant (1139). While the
other three are clearly among the best players in the game over this period, Yao Ming ranks so high
because of his popularity—he garnered the most All Star votes over this period. As Yao’s popularity
seems to be largely foreign-based, it seems unlikely that he actually generates this much additional
domestic attendance.
The effects on attendance described in Table 3.6 are overestimates: they do not take into account sellouts.
Since 42.5% of games sell out over this period, we can estimate the effects on attendance as 57.5% of the
figures given5. This gives an average of 484.5 additional fans per game for the 19 players considered, or
19863 fans over the 41 road games in a season. At an average ticket price of $47.036 this gives an average
5Two complications arise if we attempt to improve on this back-of-the-envelope calculation. While we can be fairly certain of which
games sell out, we cannot know whether they would have sold out in the absence of the star players. This suggests that the effects
calculated are underestimates of the effect of star power, since perhaps fewer of the games would have sold out without the stars. On
the other hand, the games in which the stars actually play are probably more likely to sell out, due both to the increased interest the
stars bring and to the fact that they are likely to play on an overall stronger team. This would suggest the figures given overestimate
the stars’ effects on attendance. On balance, each of these effects is likely small, and given that they occur in opposite directions, the
back-of-the-envelope calculation seems an adequate compromise.
6Average ticket price data from Rodney Fort’s Sports Business Data Pages (http://www.rodneyfort.com); average ticket prices
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annual “superstar externality” of $934,000 for the 19 players. The increase in attendance of 19863 consists
of 7223.4 fans from the players’ ability (Wins Produced), 13298.3 fans from their popularity (All Star
votes), and -659.0 fans from the superstar substitution effect on adjacent games. The most obvious
comparison is with the average figures from Berri and Schmidt (2006): for the top 25 All Star vote earners
from 1992-93 to 1995-96 and using season-level data, they found an average effect of 9846 fans from the
players’ ability and 4353 fans from their popularity, for a total of 14199 additional fans per season. This
number is similar to mine, especially given that mine is the average for a slightly stronger group of
players (19 star players instead of 25).
What is curious is that the attribution of the additional fans has switched, from being about two-to-one
due to ability rather than popularity, to two-to-one due do popularity rather than ability. One possible
explanation for this phenomenon is that All Star votes in my sample may be better measures of player
ability (and less generated by the random whims of voters) than in Berri and Schmidt (2006). Sports fans
in general have become more sophisticated in their consumption of statistics as the availability and
analysis of statistics has been promulgated by internet news sources, widespread fantasy sport
participation, and television sport analysts. Perhaps fans have become more adept at identifying and
voting for those players who are true stars.
A final observation on attendance relates to racial preferences. Racial discrimination studies have found a
natural place in sport, as the abundant data allow for the examination of the effects of race on salary
formation, promotion and retention decisions, and customer behavior. Evidence from the 1990s suggested
that fans actually preferred black players over whites. On attendance, Berri and Schmidt (2006) observed a
negative effect on attendance for the proportion of minutes played by white players: an additional 10% of
minutes played by white players on the road decreased per-game attendance by around 86. Similarly,
Hanssen and Andersen (1999) examined MLB All Star votes directly, and found that fans were more likely
to vote for a black player than a white player of comparable ability. My data shed some further light on
this subject: I include measures of the proportion of minutes played by non-black players, but also of
minutes played by players born outside North America. It turns out that Foreign Min is a substantially
better predictor of attendance than is Nonblack Min; once I adjust for the proportion of minutes played by
foreigners, race has no effect. I estimate that an additional 10% of minutes played by foreign-born players
decreases per-game road attendance by around 84 after adjusting for sellouts. That foreigners are less
popular at the turnstile is not incredibly surprising: they are more likely to begin their playing career
overseas rather than at an American college, missing out on building their American fan base before
for 2004-05 through 2007-08 were $46.32, $45.97, $46.99, and $48.83 respectively.
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starting in the NBA.
3.5 Conclusions
The foregoing analysis extends the work of Berri and Schmidt (2006) and Hausman and Leonard (1997) on
understanding the effect of star players in the NBA. I confirm the findings in Berri and Schmidt (2006) by
using game-level data instead of season-level data, the former being more appropriate to studies of the
NBA where sellouts are frequent and require appropriate care. Using censored regression (Tobit) analysis,
I find strong positive effects on attendance both for a star’s ability and his popularity. Using game-level
data I am also able to estimate a superstar substitution effect: an average star player coming to town a
week from today reduces attendance today by around 60 fans, for an average effect of 659 fewer fans per
season, a small but nonetheless interesting effect.
This essay can also serve as a guide for the estimation of game-level attendance at sporting events. The
variable schedules and the tendencies of fan interest to wax and wane with performance make accurate
estimation challenging. Modelling road attendance has the advantage that omitted variables affecting
home attendance are unlikely to bias star player coefficients, unless the variables are systematically
correlated with the presence of the star players. Attendance padding is one possible avenue for this, but as
already argued, this would likely result in conservative estimates of star player effects. A more dangerous
avenue is advertising: if games with more star players attract more advertising, the we may incorrectly
attribute the effect of the advertising to the star players themselves. Lacking good data on game-specific
advertising, I cannot separate the effects; but it is an important aspect of which to be aware.
I also extend the literature on customer racial preferences in sport by demonstrating that, where previous
studies have found black basketball players to be more popular than comparable white players, the effect
may be due to national origin rather than race. In my model, national origin is a much stronger predictor
of attendance than is race, with fans seeming to care more about whether they will see domestic players
play than players of the “right” race.
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